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ABSTRACT
Something surprising happened in the 2013 marriage equality cases that did not involve
striking down the Defense of Marriage Act. The Supreme Court discovered standing doctrine’s
state action problem. In standing doctrine, as elsewhere, the law distinguishes private from
governmental action. There are, simply put, different standing rules for state actors than for
private litigants. How should the law sort state actors from private litigants for the purposes of
standing? In Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Court held that Article III limits government standing to common law agents who owe fiduciary duties to the state. The Perry Court’s apparent
concern was the risk of abuse of the power to stand for the government in federal court. This
Article critiques the Court’s newfound agency rule, offering an alternative way to address standing’s state action problem.
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The reasons for limiting who may stand for the government in court have to do with keeping
government power constitutionally accountable, not with Article III’s case or controversy requirement. This constitutional accountability principle sounds in due process and the separation of
powers. Abuse of the power of government standing offends constitutional principles that protect
life, liberty, and property against arbitrary enforcement. These principles cannot be applied
mechanically because due process also supports a right to one’s day in court and a system of
remedies to right wrongs. Focusing upon constitutional accountability provides a framework for
identifying when standing presents a constitutionally troublesome risk of abuse of government
power and determining who may exercise that power under what circumstances. Constitutional
accountability presumptively requires public control over government standing. This presumption may be overcome where private law, procedural controls, or auxiliary mechanisms are adequate to ensure private litigants do not abuse their power to stand for the government. The
adequacy of these constraints on enforcement discretion in any particular case depends upon the
government interest at stake. Thus, the solution to standing’s state action problem varies with
different government interests and the limits in place to reduce the risk of abuse of the power of
government standing.

INTRODUCTION
Standing doctrine has a state action problem. There are different standing rules for state actors than for private litigants. Standing doctrine requires
private litigants to show a concrete, imminent, and personal injury-in-fact
traceable to the defendant and redressable by a judicial remedy.1 Yet the
doctrine does not require the same showing from government litigants. A
government litigant may litigate “generalized grievances” and need not show
a personal injury-in-fact to have standing.2 In some cases, however, standing
rules impose an “additional hurdle” to government claimants.3 These different standing rules create standing’s state action problem. The doctrine must
sort state actors from private litigants to determine which standing rules
apply. In state action doctrine, we recognize that the distinction between
state actors and private parties is not self-evident.4 Standing’s state action
1 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 27 (1960) (holding that Congress may
authorize United States to vindicate “public interest in the due observance of all the constitutional guarantees”); Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal
Prosecutions Show that Standing Doctrine Is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH.
L. REV. 2239, 2240, 2251 (1999) (explaining that United States litigates generalized grievances when prosecuting crimes in federal courts).
3 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 538 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (discussing state standing); infra Section I.A (same).
4 See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967) (calling doctrine a “conceptual disaster
area”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 505 (1985) (discussing “incoherence of the state action doctrine”); Christian Turner, State Action Problems,
65 FLA. L. REV. 281, 284 (2013) (discussing doctrine’s “conflicting intuitions”). But see
Lillian BeVier & John Harrison, The State Action Principle and its Critics, 96 VA. L. REV. 1767
(2010) (canvassing and responding to criticisms).
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problem has gone unnoticed by comparison,5 and the doctrine does not
solve it.
The 2013 marriage equality cases brought standing’s state action problem into sharp focus. In both United States v. Windsor6 and Hollingsworth v.
Perry,7 individuals challenged laws that denied marriage equality. In both
cases executive officials refused to defend the laws against constitutional challenge. And in both cases other litigants sought to defend the laws on appeal.
In Windsor, the Court permitted the “federal government to bifurcate its
standing”8 between the executive branch, which had constitutional standing,
though it refused to defend the Defense of Marriage Act, and a group of
Congressmen who provided the “substantial argument for the constitutionality” of DOMA necessary for prudential standing.9 In Perry, by contrast, the
Court held that Article III prohibits states from bifurcating their standing by
delegating the authority to defend a state constitutional amendment, in this
case California’s Proposition 8, to its private proponents. Citing the Restatement (Third) of Agency, the Court reasoned that Proposition 8’s proponents
lacked standing because “[u]nlike California’s attorney general,” they
“answer[ed] to no one” and thus were “plainly not agents of the State.”10
Something more than the meaning of Article III’s “judicial Power” is at stake
when the Court finds it necessary to incorporate the Restatement (Third) of

5 Scholars have pored over private standing. And some have considered government
standing. See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1311
(2014) [hereinafter Grove, Standing]; Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article II Nondelegation Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 781 (2009) [hereinafter Grove, Nondelegation]; Hartnett,
supra note 2, at 2245; Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 (1993); Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387
(1995); Larry W. Yackle, A Worthy Champion for Fourteenth Amendment Rights: The United States
in Parens Patriae, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 111 (1997). But we do not have a systematic appraisal
of standing’s attempt, made apparent by Hollingsworth v. Perry, to identify public “officials”
entitled to stand for the government. See 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2013). In Implied Public
Rights of Action, I explored judicially implied rights of action in favor of governments. See
Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2014). That work assumed
a traditional state actor, for example a public attorney general, would stand for the state.
This Article interrogates that assumption in the wake of Perry’s adoption of a fiduciary rule
for government standing. See 133 S. Ct. at 2664–65.
6 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
7 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
8 Suzanne B. Goldberg, Article III Double-Dipping: Proposition 8’s Sponsors, BLAG, and the
Government’s Interest, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 164, 172 (2013) (arguing that it is far from
“clear that Article III . . . permit[s] the federal government to bifurcate its standing for
purposes of having federal courts resolve policy disputes between the executive and legislative branches”).
9 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687. Though the Court did not hold that the Congressmen
had standing in their own right, it relied upon them for the arguments necessary to reach
the merits. See id.
10 Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2666.
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Agency into standing law. Put simply, Article III cannot solve standing’s state
action problem because Article III did not create it.11
To understand government standing, this Article shifts the focus from
Article III to a principle of constitutional accountability concerned with “the
arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.”12 It argues that the solution
to standing’s state action problem depends upon the government interest at
stake and the limits in place to reduce the risk of abuse of the power of
government standing.
For all its failings, state action doctrine reflects a fundamental principle
of our constitutional system: any exercise of governmental power must be
legally accountable.13 This principle of constitutional accountability follows
from the Due Process Clauses, which demand that government actions be
based upon public reasons rather than raw preferences,14 and the separation
of powers, which precludes delegations of authority that shield those wielding government power from constitutional accountability. The constitutional
accountability principle limits “outsourc[ing] . . . decisional authority to private parties—authority that binds other private parties in the government’s
name.”15 Neither courts nor scholars have explored the link between constitutional accountability and standing. Yet focusing upon it makes sense of
standing’s state action problem. The problem is to identify which instances
of standing trigger constitutional accountability concerns and to limit government standing so as to address these constitutional concerns.
This Article argues that standing to litigate government interests on the
government’s behalf triggers constitutional accountability concerns but that,
contra Perry, the Constitution does not require legislatures to limit the power
of government standing to only traditional government employees and common law agents of the state. Traditional state actors may stand for the government because they are subject to constitutional, statutory, regulatory, and
professional constraints designed to ensure that they will exercise the power
of government standing for public reasons. Formally private litigants may
stand for the government where there are sufficient protections, short of
11 Article III defines the range of judicially cognizable government interests and supports other justiciability considerations, including adversity, the sufficiency of the record
for decision, and avoidance of unnecessary judicial intervention into a political dispute.
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968). This Article leaves those considerations
untouched.
12 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516, 527 (1884)).
13 Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1373 (2003).
14 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (explaining that exercise of government power may not be based upon “purely personal and arbitrary power”).
15 Harold J. Krent, The Private Performing the Public: Delimiting Delegations to Private Parties, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 507, 511 (2011); see also Kimberly N. Brown, “We the People,” Constitutional Accountability, and Outsourcing Government, 88 IND. L.J. 1347, 1350 (2013) (arguing
that the “federal government cannot outsource its powers without putting mechanisms in
place for rendering contractors accountable to the people and to the President”).
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denying standing outright, for the rights of defendants and third parties who
may be harmed by arbitrary litigation on the government’s behalf.
It is an especially apt moment to explore the link between government
standing and constitutional accountability. The Court’s 2013 marriage equality cases crystallized the problem: in going beyond Article III to invoke the
Restatement (Third) of Agency, the Perry Court unwittingly made clear that government standing concerns much more than the Article III case or controversy requirement. It concerns limits on who may exercise government
power. The Court’s recent decision in DOT v. Association of American Railroads underscored the potential separation-of-powers and due process limits
on delegations of lawmaking authority,16 and Justice Alito’s concurrence suggested these limits apply as well to a “citizen suit to enforce existing law.”17
Standing’s state action problem, in short, concerns the limits on who may
wield the power of government standing.
This Article’s analysis of that problem unfolds as follows. Part I describes
standing doctrine’s different rules for government and private standing,
which create standing’s state action problem. It then focuses upon the
Court’s decisions in Windsor and Perry to show that Article III cannot identify
when standing involves a government power or determine which actors may
exercise the power of government standing.
Part II identifies when standing involves a government power by considering the interests a litigant aims to stand for in court.18 Standing involves a
government power when it authorizes a litigant to act on a government’s
behalf to vindicate a government interest. There are four types of government interests: corporate interests, which involve a government’s property and
contract rights; institutional interests, which concern the authority to govern
and intergovernmental immunities; administrative interests in prosecuting
crimes and enforcing regulations through civil actions; and substitute interests
in vindicating the private rights of citizens on their behalf.19
Difficult cases arise where a litigant seeks judicial action that would vindicate a public right but does not claim standing to act on the government’s
behalf. In some cases there is a private right to a remedy that will also vindicate a public right.20 In other cases there are public rights against government action and private standing is necessary to ensure a remedial system
16 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1234 (2015).
17 Id. at 1237 (Alito, J., concurring).
18 Conceptually, private standing, like government standing, involves the power to put
“judicial machinery in motion.” Robert L. Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of “Political” and “Economic” Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 197–98 (1935). It does not follow,
however, that private standing and government standing are synonymous. See infra Section
II.A.
19 Davis, supra note 5, at 17–22.
20 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364–65 (2011) (holding criminal
defendant can raise Tenth Amendment as defense to prosecution); see id. at 2367 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (explaining that due process required standing to vindicate Tenth
Amendment).
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that keeps government accountable to law.21 Standing does not delegate the
public power to enforce the law where it satisfies the government’s obligation
to provide remedies to redress personal wrongs and to keep government
accountable, even if the litigant’s action would vindicate a public right. Both
the right to a personal remedy and the demand for a system of remedies that
holds government to the law sound in due process and constitutional structure. As Chief Justice John Marshall put it in Marbury v. Madison, “[t]he very
essence of civil liberty . . . consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives . . . injury.”22 Though not
“unyielding,”23 this principle helps distinguish private from government
standing.
The other difficult class of cases involves litigants who seek to vindicate
legislatively created private rights that are functionally indistinguishable from
government interests. One important example is a citizen suit provision
authorizing a private litigant to sue regulated parties to vindicate a government’s administrative interest in enforcing the law.24 To evaluate standing in
these cases, it is necessary to make a normative judgment based upon the
breadth and depth of enforcement discretion that standing would entail.
Where private standing to enforce the law would entail sweeping enforcement discretion to burden liberty and property interests, it raises constitutional accountability concerns.
Part III develops this Article’s framework to determine who may stand
for the government and under what circumstances. This framework looks
not simply to Article III of the Constitution, but also to a structural concern
with constitutional accountability. Article I and Article II both protect
against delegations of government power that are not constitutionally
accountable.25 Constitutional accountability matters because it protects legal
rights. Governments may use their sweeping standing to enforce the law
arbitrarily against opposing parties or to litigate arbitrarily the rights of third
parties. Restrictions on who may stand for the government are rooted in
21 See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (holding that Congress may authorize citizens to litigate “widely shared” injuries against federal agencies).
22 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
23 Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1736 (1991).
24 See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183–84
(2000).
25 Article I’s nondelegation doctrine applies to delegations of legislative power to private parties. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311–12 (1936). Article II’s Appointments Clause aims to limit the arbitrary exercise of government power by making officers
of the United States accountable to the President. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163,
186 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring). Similarly, the separation of powers prevents delegations that encroach upon the Article II executive power. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, 692–93 (1988). Article II cannot account, however, for standing doctrine’s limitations
on a state legislature’s authority to authorize private litigants to stand for the state in federal court.
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protecting the due process rights of opposing parties and third parties from
the arbitrary exercise of government power.
Due process precludes a litigant from hauling another before a forum
where it would be “unreasonable” for the court to assert personal jurisdiction.26 It prohibits “bias[ed]” adjudication by requiring “an impartial and
disinterested tribunal.”27 It prohibits vague criminal statutes that give the
police leeway to engage in “arbitrary enforcement.”28 It precludes “arbitrary
punishments” through excessive punitive damages awards.29 It limits the
privatization of government regulation.30 And it explains why standing doctrine addresses the risk that a litigant would abuse the power of standing.31
Limits on standing also concern the individual right to one’s day in
court, which sounds in due process as much as in Article III. A litigant may
abuse third-party standing by arbitrarily litigating the rights of others. One
due process problem arises from inadequate representation of absent parties’
rights. When a private party sues, the doctrine has recognized this due process concern.32 When a government actor sues, by contrast, the doctrine has
been a muddle. Another due process problem might be termed the “right
not to sue,”33 or the right to determine whether one’s rights will be vindicated in court. These due process concerns have appeared in the backdrop
of government standing decisions.34 But neither courts nor commentators
have explored how due process might limit who may represent the government when it seeks to espouse the rights of its citizens.
There are four tools, short of denying standing outright, the doctrine
may use to satisfy the demand of constitutional accountability when government interests are the basis of standing. One is public control: government
26 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).
27 Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242–43 (1980).
28 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983).
29 Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 352 (2007) (quoting State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2002)).
30 Carter, 298 U.S. at 311–12.
31 One of this Article’s concerns, the problem of arbitrary enforcement, is considered
by Grove, Nondelegation, supra note 5, at 820–27, which argues that Article II protects individual liberty by prohibiting Congress from authorizing private litigants to bring administrative claims, and by Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J.
341, 359 (1989), which rejects the argument that qui tam standing violates “due process
norms.” Unlike prior commentary, this Article systematically explores the link between
government standing and constitutional accountability by considering state standing as
well as standing for the United States, identifying when standing involves a government
power and how it threatens the due process rights of opposing parties and third parties,
and explaining how the power of government standing varies among the four types of
government interests.
32 See Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the “Case or Controversy”
Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 306 (1979).
33 Ryan C. Williams, Due Process, Class Action Opt Outs, and the Right Not to Sue, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 599, 599 (2015).
34 See, e.g., Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dep’t of Labor v. Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 132 (1995).
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standing might be limited to litigants who are directly accountable to the
electorate or indirectly accountable through public officials who oversee
them. Another is private law, which may provide a claim against a litigant
who abuses her power to stand for the government. A third type is procedural controls on how a litigant may exercise her enforcement discretion.
Fourth, there are auxiliary mechanisms that may ensure the court considers
third parties’ interests in government suits.
There is no shortage of dicta for the proposition that public control is
the only way to satisfy constitutional accountability when government interests are at stake.35 There is wisdom in these dicta, which find some, though
not dispositive, support in historical practice. But this Article resists the conclusion that only traditional executive officials may stand for a government in
federal court. It argues there are three problems with this view. First, it
wrongly lumps all government interests together and fails to acknowledge
that the constitutional accountability concerns vary depending upon which
government interest is at stake. Second, it is inexplicably inconsistent with
the rules regarding constitutional accountability everywhere else in federal
public law. Neither due process, Article I, nor Article II absolutely prohibit
private parties from wielding government power. If there is a special rule
only for government standing, then it must stem from Article III, but Article
III cannot bear that weight. Third, there are important differences between
state and federal government standing. Standing for the states and standing
for the United States differ because the separation of powers mandates executive control of litigation on behalf of the United States in some cases where
due process and Article III alone would not require public control.
This Article offers a different framework than the exclusive public control view. Constitutional accountability presumptively requires public control
over government standing. In the absence of state law to the contrary, this
presumption is overcome more readily in cases involving state standing than
those involving the United States’ standing. The presumption is weakest in a
case involving a government’s institutional interests, particularly where the
litigant seeks only to defend a government’s action, because institutional
standing poses the least significant threat to due process interests. The presumption is strongest in cases involving a government’s administrative interests, which support sweeping enforcement discretion and do not depend
upon a showing of an injury to individuals. Where a government’s corporate
interests are at stake, the presumption may be overcome where private law
constraints on abusive litigation adequately deter arbitrary enforcement. In
substitute cases, the legislature may not authorize private litigants to sue
unless it has created mechanisms to police the adequacy of representation.
Part IV of this Article evaluates the constitutional accountability
approach to government standing. The most serious objection sounds in
federalism; linking standing with constitutional accountability seems inconsistent with the black letter rule that federal standing law does not constrain
35

See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140 (1976) (per curiam).
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state courts.36 To the extent that due process limits the legislature’s authority to assign government standing, then federal law imposes some standing
requirements on state courts. Part IV argues that the constitutional accountability approach provides a sensible framework for thinking about government standing in state courts. It explains that states have significant latitude
to assign standing to enforce state-created, as opposed to federal, rights.37
Part IV concludes by addressing other objections.
Properly understood, limits on government standing play a prophylactic
role in a “scheme of ordered liberty.”38 This Article’s approach clarifies the
competing values at issue in disputes about government standing, reclaims
remedial concerns for standing doctrine, and identifies a sensible place for
federal courts in the design of public enforcement. Recasting government
standing doctrine in these structural terms does not strip politics and ideology from judicial craft. Nor does it transform all the hard standing cases into
easy ones. Rather, it offers an alternative way of talking about government
standing that, unlike the Court’s injury-in-fact requirement and a simple distinction between government “officials” and private “litigants,” makes it possible to have a sensible normative debate.39
I. THE PROBLEM
There are two types of state action problems. One is addressed by state
action doctrine and concerns whether the Constitution should apply to a
defendant who claims to be a private actor.40 The other concerns an individual or institution who claims to wield state power where it is not clear they
have valid authority to do so. Government standing has a state action prob36 See Lansing Schs. Educ. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 693 (Mich.
2010) (holding that Michigan constitution does not track federal standing requirements).
But see ACLU of N.M. v. City of Albuquerque, 188 P.3d 1222, 1227 (N.M. 2008) (“[O]ur
state courts have long been guided by the traditional federal standing analysis.”).
37 Under this Article’s framework, for instance, express constitutional guarantees of
remedies give state courts greater flexibility to conclude that standing does not entail government power but fulfills the government’s obligation to provide a system of redress. See
Judith Resnik, Constitutional Entitlements to and in Courts: Remedial Rights in an Age of Egalitarianism: The Childress Lecture, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 917, 999 app.1 (2012) (listing forty-one
states that have right to remedy or open court provisions in constitution).
38 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled on other grounds by Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
39 That’s all. But that’s enough. See Joseph William Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 899, 907 (2009) (discussing “pervasive fantasy that we can escape the
need for normative argument, controversial assumptions, and human judgment”).
40 State action doctrine distinguishes state action, which is subject to constitutional
constraint, from private action, which isn’t. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch.
Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Whenever “legal obligations would be enforced
through the official power of . . . courts” there is state action in the sense that judicial
action is state action. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991). Courts do
not, however, treat every private enforcement action as state action. The closest the Court
came to doing so was Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), and it has never read that case
for all it may be worth.
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lem in this second sense. This Part describes the standing rules that create
standing’s state action problem. It then discusses the Court’s standing decisions in the 2013 marriage equality cases, showing that Article III cannot
alone make sense of standing’s state action problem.
A.
1.

The Differences Between Government Standing and Private Standing

Sweeping Interests and Special Solicitude

According to the Supreme Court, standing doctrine is “built on a single
basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”41 In theory, standing limits
Article III courts to judicial business by requiring private litigants to show a
concrete, imminent, and personal injury-in-fact traceable to the defendant
and redressable by a judicial remedy.42 Standing doctrine’s focus upon injuries-in-fact creates a conceptual conundrum when a government claims a
right to judicial relief. After all, “There is no such thing as the State.”43 It
cannot be struck. It cannot be jailed. It cannot feel disappointment, or frustration, or pain. It is therefore more accurate (and useful) to speak of government interests rather than injuries-in-fact when considering government
standing.
Government litigants have judicially cognizable interests even when they
have not suffered concrete and personal injuries-in-fact. As a result, governments have standing where a private litigant, who must allege an injury-infact, would not. For instance, the United States needs no injury-in-fact to
have standing to enforce federal law,44 and may sue to “see[ ] that the law is
obeyed.”45 A state has standing to vindicate its “sovereign power . . . to create
and enforce a legal code” and to protect public health and welfare.46 Unlike
a private party, therefore, the United States or a state may litigate a “generalized grievance.”47 Thus, governments’ judicially cognizable interests are
sweeping and need not depend upon an injury-in-fact.
In particular, there are four types of interests that governments may litigate. The first type is corporate interests. Like private corporations, governments have standing as property owners and parties to contracts and may
41 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
42 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992).
43 W.H. Auden, September 1, 1939, in CHARLES OSBORNE, W.H. AUDEN: THE LIFE OF A
POET 194 (1979).
44 See Hartnett, supra note 2, at 2251.
45 Grove, Nondelegation, supra note 5, at 782 (quoting FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24
(1998)) (“[A]lthough Congress may, consistent with Article III, authorize the Executive
Branch to assert the abstract ‘injury to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed,’ Congress may not confer similarly broad standing on private parties.” (quoting Akins, 524 U.S.
at 24)); see id. at 794 (“Congress may, consistent with Article III, authorize the Executive
Branch to see that the law is obeyed.” (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 27
(1960))).
46 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601, 607
(1982).
47 Raines, 362 U.S. at 27.
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enforce their corporate interests. Under current doctrine, it is unclear how
much authority the legislature has to authorize enforcement of corporate
interests by anyone other than an executive official, such as the Attorney
General.48 Standing to litigate institutional interests has also defied Article III
analysis. Institutional interests consist of a government’s interests as a political, rather than a corporate, institution. Controversy abounds when a formally private litigant seeks to litigate an institutional interest.49 The state
action problem has also arisen where the government’s administrative interests in enforcing the law and deterring violations are at stake. These administrative interests would seem to be “public rights” that only public officials may
litigate,50 yet it is not hard to identify cases that involve administrative interests where, nevertheless, standing is uncontroversial under the Court’s injuryin-fact test.51 The state action problem becomes even more perplexing
where a litigant seeks to vindicate a government’s substitute interests in litigating its citizens’ private rights.52 Perhaps most perplexing is that federal
courts have treated state agencies as private associations in order to find
standing where a state agency would otherwise lack it.53
Standing doctrine shows “special solicitude” when government interests
are at stake.54 For example, federal courts may relax standing doctrine’s causation and redressability requirements for governments. In Massachusetts v.
EPA, the Court granted standing to Massachusetts to sue the Environmental

48 See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 778 n.8
(2000).
49 The Court only recently made clear that a criminal defendant has standing to raise
a Tenth Amendment challenge to a federal law under which she is being prosecuted.
Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2011). Whether this rule applies where a
private litigant is not the subject of an enforcement action remains an open question, cf.
Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 716 (9th Cir. 1981), and scholars have questioned whether
there should be private standing to litigate institutional interests, see Aziz Z. Huq, Standing
for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1440 (2013).
50 See infra Section III.A.
51 See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432–33 (1964).
52 Federal courts have struggled to identify when a litigant has valid authority to stand
for a government in substitute litigation. Compare, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Ill. State Bd. of
Educ., 810 F.2d 707, 712 & n.7 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that state school board was not
state actor for purposes of parens patriae substitute standing in suit alleging race discrimination by local school board), with id. at 713 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority
had set “dangerous precedent for frustrating federal anti-discrimination statutes and the
fourteenth amendment”). For other recent examples, see Thiebaut v. Colorado Springs Utilities, 455 F. App’x 795, 801 (10th Cir. 2011), and Cheng v. WinCo Foods LLC, No. 14-CV-0483JST, 2014 WL 2735796, at *10 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2014).
53 See, e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977); State
of Conn. Office of Prot. & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities v. Connecticut, 706 F.
Supp. 2d 266, 283 (D. Conn. 2010).
54 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007).
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Protection Agency for refusing to address greenhouse gas emissions,55 citing
the sort of probabilistic injury that rarely suffices for private standing.56
2.

Judicial Disfavor

Standing doctrine disfavors “private attorney general” litigation of generalized grievances in which a private party’s interest is “in proper application
of the Constitution and laws.”57 In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court
held that Article III prohibits Congress from authorizing a private litigant to
vindicate the national public interest in seeing that the law is enforced.58
And even where a private litigant plausibly claims a personal interest, the
Court may deem it a nonjusticiable generalized grievance if the interest
appears too abstract.59 Public attorneys general—that is, litigants deemed
proper representatives of the government’s interest—are not so limited.
At the same time, however, standing doctrine occasionally imposes additional hurdles when a state actor sues, evincing a special concern for the
abuse of government power. For example, a private association may espouse
the rights of its members without alleging an independent interest,60 but a
state cannot sue on its citizens’ behalf without an interest “apart from the
interests of particular private parties.”61 Moreover, while the United States
needs express statutory authorization to have standing to vindicate its citizens’ civil rights,62 private organizations’ representative standing may be
implied.63 Thus, whether the question is judicial solicitude or judicial disfavor for governments, standing doctrine must distinguish government from
private interests and state actors from private litigants.
B.

Article III and Standing’s State Action Problem

The Court’s decisions in the 2013 marriage equality cases show that Article III cannot by itself distinguish government from private interests or identify who may exercise the power of government standing.
1.

United States v. Windsor

In Windsor, the Court held that the Defense of Marriage Act, which
defined “marriage” for purposes of federal law to exclude same-sex mar55 Id. at 521–23.
56 See Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing’s Expected Value, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1283, 1285
(2013).
57 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992).
58 Id. at 573.
59 See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 164 (1990).
60 See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
61 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
62 See United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1980).
63 See United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517
U.S. 544, 557 (1996).
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riages, violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.64 In the normal
course, the Department of Justice would have defended DOMA against constitutional challenge. The DOJ, however, declined to defend DOMA, though
the United States remained liable to Edith Windsor for a tax refund under
the district court’s judgment striking down the statute.65 Instead of the DOJ,
the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG), a small group of members of
the House of Representatives, defended DOMA on appeal. The Court held
that the United States’ liability under the district court’s judgment sufficed
for constitutional standing and that BLAG’s “substantial” defense of DOMA
provided the adversity required for prudential standing.66 This holding was
unusual. Federal courts are usually reticent to permit Congress, much less
the House alone or a group of House members, to take on the task of vindicating federal law.67 To be sure, the Court found it “need not decide
whether BLAG would have standing” in its own right.68 But Windsor stands
for a prudential rule that where congressional representatives present a
“capable defense” of a law the executive enforces but refuses to defend, the
Court may proceed to the merits.69
2.

Hollingsworth v. Perry

In Perry, by contrast, the Court did not proceed to the merits of marriage
equality. Perry concerned the constitutionality of Proposition 8, a ballot initiative that California voters adopted to define “marriage [as] between a man
and a woman.”70 Two same-sex couples sued state officials to enjoin implementation of Proposition 8, arguing it violated their rights to due process
and equal protection. California’s governor and attorney general, like the
President and DOJ in Windsor, refused to defend the law. The district court
permitted Proposition 8’s proponents to intervene, and ultimately struck
down the law.71 The Ninth Circuit held that Proposition 8’s proponents had
standing on appeal, and affirmed on the merits.72 There was no doubt that
California had authorized Proposition 8’s proponents to defend the state law,
because the California Supreme Court had held that the state constitution
and election code implicitly did so.73
In theory, the California Supreme Court’s holding could have been the
end of the standing question. But the U.S. Supreme Court held that Proposi64 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).
65 See id. at 2684.
66 Id. at 2687.
67 See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself
in Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 571 (2014).
68 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2688.
69 Id. at 2689.
70 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) (quoting CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 7.5).
71 See id. at 2660.
72 See id.
73 See Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002 (Cal. 2011).
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tion 8’s proponents lacked standing to appeal.74 The “fact that a State thinks
a private party should have standing to seek relief for a generalized grievance
cannot override our settled law to the contrary,” the Court explained,
because “standing in federal court is a question of federal law, not state
law.”75
The Court in Perry was forced to rove far beyond Article III to conclude
that Proposition 8’s proponents lacked standing. Citing the Restatement
(Third) of Agency, the Court reasoned that Proposition 8’s proponents lacked
standing because they were not common law agents of the state.76 The
absence of a fiduciary relationship, the Perry Court explained, created too
great a risk that Proposition 8’s proponents would abuse their litigation
authority.77
Thus Article III alone did not solve the state action problem, leading the
Court to grapple for a solution in agency law. As I have argued elsewhere,
defining government power in fiduciary terms has significant conceptual,
doctrinal, and practical problems.78 Conceptually, the Perry Court left
unclear in which ways standing for the state must involve a fiduciary relationship. At times it seemed to envision a fiduciary relationship between the litigant and the people.79 At others it seemed to say that a litigant must be a
fiduciary for elected officials in order to stand for the government.80 As a
doctrinal matter, the Perry Court’s newfound agency rule is inconsistent with
precedent. Private attorneys may have standing to prosecute criminal contempt charges even though they are not common law agents of the court,
political officials, or “We the People.”81 Qui tam relators are not common
law agents of the state, but the Perry Court purported to leave this long-recognized “private attorney general” mechanism untouched.82 As a practical matter, the Court’s agency rule calls into question settled enforcement regimes
and leaves legislatures uncertain about their flexibility to design new ones.
Following Perry, neither the United States nor a state may “issu[e] to
private parties who otherwise lack standing a ticket to the federal courthouse.”83 At the same time, however, the United States or a state may
authorize “officials to speak [for them] in federal court” even though the
officials would otherwise lack standing.84 This distinction begs the question.
Under California law, didn’t Proposition 8’s proponents hold a limited
74 See Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2659.
75 See id. at 2667.
76 See id. at 2666–67.
77 See id.
78 See Seth Davis, The False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145
(2014).
79 See Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2667.
80 See id. at 2666.
81 See id. at 2673 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a)(2); Young v.
United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 807 (1987)).
82 See id. at 2665 (majority opinion).
83 Id. at 2667.
84 Id. at 2664.
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“office” tasked with defending the ballot initiative if the attorney general
would not? Alternatively, isn’t office-holding irrelevant where a litigant
claims standing based upon legislative authorization but not legislative
office?85 Perry’s answers to these questions are wholly unconvincing, and its
Article III approach to standing’s state action problem leaves one puzzled as
to why standing might be a device to curtail the use and abuse of government
power.86
II. STANDING

AS A

GOVERNMENT POWER

Article III can tell us when a government has an interest that gives it
standing in court. It cannot, however, tell us how to distinguish between
private standing and government standing in difficult cases. Nor can it tell us
who may stand for the government, which, after all, cannot stand for itself.
This Part identifies when standing involves a government power. Standing
involves a government power when a government interest is at stake, the litigant seeks judicial action that would vindicate that interest, and the litigant
seeks that judicial action on the government’s behalf. This Part rejects the
view that all private standing involves government power and the view that all
85 Id. at 2672 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[P]roponents’ authority under California law
is not contingent on officeholder status . . . .”).
86 It is possible to reconcile Windsor and Perry in formalist terms. In Windsor, there was
an Article III injury to the United States, which owed Windsor a tax refund under the
district court’s judgment, while in Perry, there was no Article III injury because Proposition
8’s proponents’ only interest was ideological. But if, as Perry would have it, the purpose of
standing doctrine is to avoid “an active political debate,” Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2659, then the
Court erred in recognizing government standing in Windsor.
It is also possible to see Windsor and Perry in terms of raw politics. The Court—and in
particular some members of its so-called “liberal” wing—gave “a little something” to each
side of the debate about gay marriage by striking down DOMA while leaving the definition
of marriage to the states. Cf. Trevor Burrus, A Tactful Move Toward Marriage Equality: How
the Supreme Court Will Give Both Sides a Victory in the Gay Marriage Cases, THE BLAZE (Apr. 1,
2013), http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/tactful-move-toward-marriageequality-how-supreme-court-will-give-both-sides. Perhaps some members of the Court
thought it prudent to wait a little longer to recognize a right to marriage equality, which
the Court did in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Notwithstanding these alternative explanations of the divergent standing decisions, Windsor and Perry helpfully frame
standing’s state action problem. Perry, after all, confronted the problem head-on and
made new law in trying to solve it.
This Article offers an internal critique of government standing doctrine. Of course,
“[i]t is a commonplace that the Justices of the Supreme Court routinely manipulate standing doctrine to promote their ideological goals [and] . . . that seeking to make sense of
standing doctrine is a fool’s errand.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Make Sense of Supreme
Court Standing Cases—A Plea for the Right Kind of Realism, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 105,
105 (2014). But, as Richard Fallon has argued, it is possible to “make[ ] sense [of the law]
in its own terms” while taking into account the “insights of social science” and “parsing . . .
opinions” to describe legal doctrine based upon “the kinds of facts that actually drive legal
decisions.” Id. at 106–07. As he notes with respect to Perry, “California’s attempted assignment of its interests in defending Proposition 8 . . . fits into previously established doctrinal
patterns in complex ways.” Id. at 122. This Article makes sense of that complexity.
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standing to vindicate public rights involves government power. Both views
are inconsistent with standing doctrine, due process, and a democratic vision
in which the courts are open to redress wrongs and to hold government
accountable to law.
A.

Private Standing and Government Powers

Identifying when standing entails a government power is often easy.
There’s no doubt, for example, when a litigant’s complaint premises standing solely upon legislative authorization to vindicate government interests on
the government’s behalf. Since the late 1960s, however, there has been a
“vast increase in private enforcement actions under federal law,”87 and the
definitional status of many of these actions is a matter of “deep” disagreement among legal commentators.88
Critics of state action doctrine have argued there is no meaningful distinction between government power and private power. As Morris Cohen
long ago pointed out with respect to private property, behind every private
right looms the power of the state that enforces it.89 The critics are correct
that private standing is as much a power to invoke the judicial process as
government standing is. It does not follow, however, that private standing
and government standing are synonymous.
Part I already described an important functional distinction between private and government standing under current doctrine. Government standing entails significant enforcement discretion. The range of judicially
cognizable government interests includes an interest in enforcing the law, an
interest in preserving the “sovereign power . . . to create . . . a legal code,”
and an interest in the “health and well-being” of the citizenry.90 Private
standing does not entail enforcement discretion of this breadth and depth
because, unlike governments, private litigants must show a concrete and personal injury-in-fact. Abuse of the sweeping power of government standing is,
in general, more likely than abuse of the power of private standing to foster
sweepingly unjust policies.
Distinguishing between government standing, which may entail broad
and deep discretion to enforce the law, and private standing, which is comparatively constrained by the injury-in-fact requirement, is useful but incomplete. An organization’s standing to litigate on behalf of its members, as well
as a class plaintiff’s standing to represent a class, may create sweeping
87 Stephen B. Burbank et al., Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 647
(2013).
88 See id. at 639.
89 Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927) (describing
“property as sovereign power compelling service and obedience”); see also Chemerinsky,
supra note 4, at 505.
90 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601, 607
(1982).
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enforcement discretion, but neither is understood to involve government
power.91
Why the distinction between government standing and the standing of
organizations and class action plaintiffs? The answer is suggested by a perplexing series of cases involving state actors suing as private organizations.
Private organizations, the Court has held, have associational standing to sue
on behalf of their members who have suffered injuries-in-fact, as long as the
suit is germane to the organization’s purposes and the participation of the
individual members is not necessary to provide relief.92 What’s perplexing is
that the Court developed this rule for private standing in a case involving a
state agency, not a private organization. In Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Advertising Commission, the Court held that a state agency could sue on behalf
of the state’s apple growers and dealers.93 The defendants understandably
argued that the Commission was not a private association with associational
standing, but rather was a state agency that lacked a judicially cognizable
government interest.94 The Court conceded that the Commission was a state
agency but nevertheless treated it as a private association in order to find it
had standing to “prosecut[e] . . . this kind of litigation” on behalf of “a specialized segment of the State’s economic community.”95 Hunt involved a
state agency but not state standing because the suit was on behalf of private
parties who had suffered injuries-in-fact, not on the state’s behalf.
Scholars have made sense of state action doctrine in precisely these
terms. Gillian Metzger argues that the “characteristic of acting on behalf of
government is what makes . . . private delegations particularly threatening to
the principle of constitutionally-constrained government.”96 Similarly, Lillian BeVier and John Harrison argue that state action doctrine “reflects a
vision of the Constitution” in which state actors, unlike private parties, “may
not seek to maximize their own welfare” but instead “must always act on
behalf of their citizen principals.”97 Understood in these terms, standing is a
government power when it authorizes the litigant to act on behalf of the
government to vindicate government interests.
This distinction between government standing and private standing
finds support in a familiar principle that has been given short shrift in mod91 But see Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class
Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 152 (2003) (“[T]he class action . . . has emerged not
simply as a procedural supplement to preexisting law but, rather, as an institutional rival to
the ordinary process of lawmaking itself.”).
92 Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
93 Id. at 344.
94 Id. at 341.
95 Id. at 344 (“The Commission, while admittedly a state agency, for all practical purposes, performs the functions of a traditional trade association representing the Washington apple industry.”); see also Office of Prot. & Advocacy for Pers. with Disabilities v.
Connecticut, 706 F. Supp. 2d 266, 280–83 (D. Conn. 2010) (providing recent example of
standing decision based upon treating state agency as private organization under Hunt).
96 Metzger, supra note 13, at 1462.
97 BeVier & Harrison, supra note 4, at 1767, 1796.
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ern standing law. The principle is that a right implies a remedy. This principle sounds in due process and is deeply rooted in our tradition of ordered
liberty, as John Goldberg and Tracy Thomas have argued.98 Citing Blackstone (who in turn relied upon John Locke), Chief Justice John Marshall
celebrated the right-remedy principle in Marbury v. Madison, explaining that
“the very essence of civil liberty” requires government to recognize a remedy
“for the violation of a vested legal right.”99 Nineteenth-century due process
case law recognized the right to a remedy. In Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v.
Humes, the Court explained that “[i]t is the duty of every State to provide, in
the administration of justice, for the redress of private wrongs.”100 As
Goldberg has described, Humes’s dictum echoed the Court’s holding in
Poindexter v. Greenhow that due process supports a right to redress: “‘No one,’
the Court held, ‘would contend that a law of a State, forbidding all redress by
actions at law for injuries to property, would be upheld in the courts of the
United States, for that would be to deprive one of his property without due
process of law.’”101 Drawing upon this principle, the Court’s seminal decision in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby held that the “especial” beneficiaries of a federal statute had standing under the common law to sue for
harms they suffered from statutory violations.102 In Bivens, the Court held
that the Constitution implies a damages remedy where, as Justice John Marshall Harlan put it in his concurrence, it is “damages or nothing.”103
In these cases private standing “empowers” a rights-holder in order to
place the “decision to complain about an alleged wrong . . . uniquely with the
victim.”104 Where a right implies a remedy, private standing is categorically
different from “criminal prosecutions and administrative proceedings.”105
By empowering a private party to litigate on her own behalf, private standing
98 See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right
to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 527 (2005); Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi
Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy Under Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633
(2004).
99 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1805); see Goldberg, supra note 98, at 545.
100 115 U.S. 512, 521 (1885).
101 Goldberg, supra note 98, at 570 (quoting Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 303
(1884)).
102 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916).
103 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
409–10 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
104 Goldberg, supra note 98, at 601.
105 Id. at 602. This account of the remedial implications of due process, though controversial, is sound. It is controversial because the current Court disfavors implied private
rights of action, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009), and because it is in tension
with the Court’s statements that the Constitution does not create affirmative rights, see
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 189–90 (1989). The
account is sound, however, because it does not depend upon due process guaranteeing a
right to a remedy in every case. Instead, the due process guarantee of a system adequate to
redress wrongs (unlike, for example, the right to demand that the state prosecute another
person) leaves government with “substantial discretion in shaping” the enforcement system. Goldberg, supra note 98, at 595. This Part argues simply that standing doctrine’s
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helps satisfy the state’s public responsibility to provide private remedies, and
thus public reason and private preferences are congruent.
Private standing also helps hold government constitutionally accountable. As Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer argued in an influential article,
constitutional accountability “demands a system of constitutional remedies
adequate to keep government generally within the bounds of law.”106 Standing law can support—or undermine—this remedial system. Consider City of
Los Angeles v. Lyons, in which the Court denied an African-American man who
had been choked by police standing to seek injunctive relief against the
police department’s policies on chokeholds.107 As Fallon has argued, the
denial of standing in Lyons amounted to the denial of remedies necessary to
keep government constitutionally accountable.108
To treat private standing as simply government power gives short shrift
to its role in realizing rights to remedies and ensuring constitutional accountability. The right to a remedy reflects a vision of “broad citizen access to our
federal courts.”109 Private standing allows citizens to pursue legal redress on
their own behalf. Though the right-remedy idea traces its “pedigree” to a
concern with “non-arbitrary treatment” that is “independent of democracy,”
the demand that courts be open has come to reflect a “pervasive concern that
courts, as structures of governance themselves, need the participatory parity
of litigants to legitimate the judgments rendered.”110
B.

Government Powers and Public Rights

Standing’s distinction between state actors and private litigants seeks to
put public reasons and private preferences in their proper places within the
litigation system. Litigants may put judicial machinery in motion for public
reasons or out of private preferences. Both have their place in a scheme of
ordered liberty. Private standing entails the power to stand for one’s private
preferences in court. Government standing, by contrast, is a power to act for
the government to vindicate its public interests. Three important doctrinal
consequences follow from the conclusion that standing involves a government power when a litigant seeks to vindicate a government interest on the
government’s behalf.111
distinction between private standing and government power makes sense insofar as private
standing fulfills the government’s duty to provide an adequate system of redress.
106 Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 23, at 1778–79.
107 461 U.S. 95, 96 (1983).
108 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the
Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 74–75 (1984).
109 Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (2010) (discussing vision of private enforcement behind
creation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
110 Resnik, supra note 37, at 972.
111 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a), the government is a real party in
interest when a private litigant sues on its behalf. See United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City
of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 934 (2009). Rule 17 also requires a litigant to have the capacity

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-2\ndl203.txt

2015]

unknown

Seq: 21

standing doctrine’s state action problem

4-FEB-16

9:02

605

First, standing to request remedies that would vindicate public rights is
not always synonymous with government power.112 The Court’s standing
decision in Bond v. United States provides an example of a private right to a
remedy that vindicates public rights—in this case the states’ institutional
interests under the Tenth Amendment.113 In Bond, the Court held that a
criminal defendant has standing to raise the Tenth Amendment as a defense
to a federal prosecution.114 Criticizing Bond, Aziz Huq has argued that standing to vindicate a government’s institutional interests involves an exclusive
(or, at least, nearly exclusive) government power under Article III.115 On
that view, the policies underlying Article III prohibit courts from recognizing
private standing that would vindicate institutional interests.
Looking beyond Article III to due process explains why Bond’s standing
did not involve a government power. In her concurring opinion, Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg reasoned that due process guarantees a “personal right
not to be convicted under a constitutionally invalid law” and demands that a
criminal defendant have a remedy to protect her personal right.116 Because
Bond could claim that her private right required a private remedy, standing
did not present a constitutionally troubling conflict between private and public interests.
to sue, see FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b), which is a personal qualification to come into court separate from a right of action for relief. See, e.g., Moore v. Matthew’s Book Co., 597 F.2d 645,
647 (8th Cir. 1979). There may be some overlap between capacity and standing in government suits but as a formal matter only standing concerns the court’s jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Gonzalez-Jimenez de Ruiz v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1196 (M.D. Fla. 2002)
(“Capacity to sue differs from standing, as capacity to sue ‘speaks to a party’s legal qualification, such as legal age, that determines one’s ability to sue or be sued.’”).
112 Whether standing to vindicate public rights is an exclusively government power is a
distinct question from whether only traditional state actors may be authorized to litigate
public rights on the government’s behalf. See Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does
History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 698 (2004) (“It is theoretically possible, of course, for a legal system to view criminal prosecutions as actions by the public to
vindicate public rights while simultaneously allowing victims or other private individuals to
conduct the prosecution on behalf of the public.”). Part III addresses the second question.
113 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2359–60 (2011).
114 See id. at 2359. When the case reached the Court for the second time, it held that
the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementing Act did not reach Bond’s alleged conduct, which involved “an amateur attempt by a jilted wife to injure her husband’s lover
[and] . . . ended up causing only a minor thumb burn readily treated by rinsing with
water.” Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (2014).
115 See Huq, supra note 49, at 1440 (arguing that “individual litigants should be categorically barred from obtaining relief based on the disparagement of governance structures
held in common even if they have been hauled into court in the first instance as a civil or a
criminal defendant,” except in cases where they “assert a due process-like interest isomorphic with Article III of the Constitution”).
116 Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2367 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Richard H. Fallon, Jr., AsApplied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1331–33
(2000)); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 739 (1969) (Black, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-2\ndl203.txt

606

unknown

Seq: 22

notre dame law review

4-FEB-16

9:02

[vol. 91:2

Second, private standing to vindicate public rights against the government is necessary to keep government accountable to law and does not
involve a delegation of the power of government standing. Many voting
rights cases against state governments fit within this category.117 Private
standing to seek judicial review of federal agency action may also involve public rights but not the power of government standing. That is the best way to
understand FEC v. Akins.118 In that case the Court held that voters could sue
to vindicate an “informational” injury where the Federal Election Commission concluded that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee did not
have to disclose its membership, contributions, and expenditures under the
Federal Election Commission Act.119 The Court granted standing, concluding that “where a harm is concrete, though widely shared, [there is an]
‘injury in fact.’”120 In other words, a public right may support standing to
hold government officials to the rule of law.121
Bond and Akins make sense in terms of remedies and constitutional
accountability. It would be strange to describe litigation of citizens’ rights
against government as a government power. By contrast, litigation of public
rights on behalf of a government involves government power.
Third, in some cases Congress has created private rights of action against
regulated parties that should be treated as public rights of action to sue on
behalf of the government. One example is the citizen suit provision at issue
in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.122 In
that case, the Court held that an environmental group had standing under
the Clean Water Act to sue an alleged polluter even though “there had been
‘no demonstrated proof of harm to the environment.’”123 Justice Antonin
Scalia, writing in dissent, was correct that there was no immediate and tangible injury-in-fact to the plaintiffs.124 Nevertheless, the Court held that the
plaintiffs’ “reasonable concerns” about environmental harms gave them
standing to sue for damages on behalf of the United States because the
117 See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1663, 1666 (2001); Saul Zipkin, Democratic Standing, 26 J.L. & POL. 179, 197 (2011).
118 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
119 Id. at 13–14.
120 Id. at 24.
121 See Kimberly N. Brown, Justiciable Generalized Grievances, 68 MD. L. REV. 221, 279
(2008) (“Had the Akins Court not seized on the lack of information to find standing . . . no
plaintiff could sue to enforce the FECA in federal court . . . .”). It might be objected,
however, that private standing to sue federal executive agencies runs afoul of Article II,
where there is no private injury-in-fact, on the theory that private suits to enforce federal
law against the executive interfere with the President’s power to execute the laws. As discussed below, infra note 168, I am not persuaded by this objection, but this Article’s analysis does not aim to add to the existing debate about this Article II theory about private
standing.
122 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
123 Id. at 199 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc., v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 956 F. Supp. 588, 602 (D.S.C. 1997)).
124 See id. (majority opinion).
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threat of damages would deter future pollution.125 This suit, though based
upon a private right of action, should be understood as involving formally
private litigants standing for the government’s administrative interest in
enforcing the law against regulated parties. Unlike a suit against a federal
agency, a suit on behalf of an agency against regulated parties poses a threat to
due process protected rights. Laidlaw was wrongly decided under the rule
the Court announced in Hollingsworth v. Perry because the Clean Water Act
did not create a “fiduciary” relationship between citizen litigants and the
state.126 But, as Part III argues, the Constitution does not limit government
standing solely to “fiduciaries” of the state. Instead, the Constitution requires
that government standing be structured to keep government power constitutionally accountable.
III. GOVERNMENT STANDING

AND

CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY

The point is so fundamental as to be easily missed: the Constitution
requires that government power—including the power of government standing—be “structurally accountable to the people.”127 Across a wide array of
doctrines, “the Constitution requires all government action to be justified by
reference to some public value.”128 The Constitution may enforce this
requirement directly by requiring review of specific government actions or
prophylactically by ensuring structures that reduce the risk of abuse of government power. Government standing is just such a prophylactic doctrine.
Thus, government standing concerns much more than the Article III case-orcontroversy requirement as measured by injuries-in-fact.
There is a strong argument that public control is the only way to satisfy
constitutional accountability for government standing no matter the government interest at stake. This Part, however, argues that this view has three
problems. First, the constitutional concerns vary across the four types of government interests. Second, a flat prohibition upon private enforcement of
government interests is inconsistent with the rules regarding constitutional
accountability everywhere else in public law. Third, the exclusive public control view conflates standing for the states and standing for the United States
even though the Constitution does not require the states to adopt Article II’s
requirements for their executive branches. In lieu of the exclusive public
control view, this Part argues for a presumption in favor of public control,
which can be overcome depending upon the government interest at stake
and the safeguards in place to reduce the risk of abuse of government
standing.
The argument proceeds in four Sections. Section III.A sketches the
exclusive public control view. Section III.B argues that Article III cannot sus125 Id. at 183–84.
126 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2664–67 (2013).
127 Brown, supra note 15, at 1350.
128 Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1692
(1984).
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tain a special rule—applicable only to standing—absolutely prohibiting private litigants from exercising government power. Section III.C discusses the
underlying constitutional rights that create the demand that government
standing be constitutionally accountable. Section III.D shows how to keep
government standing constitutionally accountable by developing a framework for determining who may stand for the states and the United States in
corporate, institutional, substitute, and administrative suits.
A.

Exclusive Public Control

In Buckley v. Valeo, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the exclusive public
control view, opining that only “Officers of the United States” may “conduct[ ] civil litigation in the courts of the United States for vindicating public
rights.”129 This statement is obviously overbroad; state officials, after all, may
litigate public rights in federal court. But the view has oft been repeated. In
Lujan, for example, the Court stated that “individual rights,” which will support private standing, “do not mean public rights.”130 Similarly, in Schenck v.
Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, the Court stated that “a plaintiff customarily alleges violations of private rights, while ‘public safety’ expresses a
public right enforced by the government.”131
The strongest support for the view that only executive officials may stand
for a government comes from history. Ann Woolhandler and Caleb Nelson
have argued that, though the practice of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
courts may not “compel[ ] acceptance of the modern Supreme Court’s vision
of standing,” it does support “the requirements of public control over public
rights and private control over private rights.”132 Quoting Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, they argue that the
“general rule” in the Early Republic was “[u]ndoubtedly” that “it is for the
public officers exclusively to apply [for judicial relief], where public rights
are to be subserved.”133
As Woolhandler and Nelson point out, the practice in public nuisance
cases underscores that private litigants did not have general standing to
129 424 U.S. 1, 140 (1976) (opining that the “primary responsibility for conducting civil
litigation in the courts of the United States for vindicating public rights . . . may be discharged only by persons who are ‘Officers of the United States’”).
130 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992).
131 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997).
132 Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 112, at 691, 695. Woolhandler’s and Nelson’s
nuanced historical account concludes by observing that “standing doctrine implicates not
only Article III but also a variety of other constitutional concerns, including the relationships among all three branches of the federal government, the relationship between the
federal government and the states, and the demands of due process.” Id. at 732. In developing a framework for government standing doctrine that looks to due process and constitutional accountability, I have drawn upon and benefitted from Woolhandler’s and
Nelson’s important suggestion that standing reflects a “variety of . . . constitutional concerns” including due process. Id.
133 Id. at 709 (quoting In re Wellington, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 87, 104 (1834)).
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enforce the law.134 Public nuisances were unreasonable interferences with a
property right shared in common by the public. Executive officials could
prosecute actions to abate public nuisances and punish those responsible.135
A person who suffered “special damage” could sue on her own behalf, but an
uninjured party had no standing under the common law to prosecute an
action to redress the public wrong.136
In addition to history, there is a strong functional argument for exclusive
public control of government standing. The wide range of judicially cognizable government interests means that those who stand for the government
have significant discretion to burden the constitutional rights of opposing
parties and third parties not before the court. Limiting government standing
to executive officials would address these constitutional concerns. After all,
executive officials are state actors subject directly to constitutional constraints
under the state action doctrine. Moreover, they may be held politically
accountable for their decisions, directly through elections or indirectly
through the elected officials who appointed them. Nonconstitutional rules
and norms limit their enforcement discretion. In the usual course, government attorneys are salaried employees who do not have personal financial
interests at stake in any particular enforcement action. Internal agency controls, not to mention government ethics standards, constitutional rights, and
a sense of public responsibility, bear upon a public attorney general’s litigation decisions. Accordingly, we expect that elected officials and traditional
government employees will “look to the public good, not private gain” and
enforce the law based upon public reasons, not for “selfish reasons or arbitrarily.”137 When they do not, there are legal and political remedies against
them.
B.

Article III and Private Delegations

This Article argues, however, that the Constitution does not limit government standing to executive officials in all cases. The requirement of constitutional accountability for government power may be satisfied in more
than one way.
Both the states and the United States regularly delegate substantial
authority to private actors. These private delegations are an accepted and
often celebrated feature of modern government.138 More important, most
private delegations are constitutional.
134 Id. at 700.
135 See, e.g., State ex rel. Williams v. Karston, 187 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Ark. 1945) (discussing
common law and Attorney General’s standing to sue); Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note
112, at 700.
136 City of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 91, 97 (1838).
137 Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. DOT, 721 F.3d 666, 675 (D.C. Cir. 2013), rev’d and remanded on
other grounds sub nom. DOT v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015).
138 See generally Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543
(2000).
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Article I provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in . . . Congress.”139 The Court has interpreted this vesting clause to
prohibit Congress from delegating its legislative powers to other state actors
or to private parties.140 This nondelegation doctrine constrains only the
most sweeping delegations of lawmaking authority, however, requiring simply
that Congress provide an intelligible principle to guide a delegate’s lawmaking discretion.141 Almost any congressional guidance suffices.142
Under current doctrine, moreover, Article II permits private delegations. Article II vests the executive power in the President, obliges her to take
care to execute the laws, and gives her the power to appoint “Superior
Officers.”143 Delegations of executive power to private persons might violate
the separation of powers by depriving the executive branch of control of law
execution or otherwise disrupting the balance of power among the
branches.144 And yet we have private associations setting regulatory standards for industries,145 self-regulatory organizations enforcing administrative
regulations,146 private third parties monitoring regulated parties for compliance with federal standards,147 privately run prisons incarcerating individuals
on the United States’ behalf,148 and so on, with federal courts countenancing
significant delegations of powers to implement the law beyond traditional
executive officials.149
Due process also limits private delegations, but leaves legislatures with
substantial discretion to privatize government functions. Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., the foundational private nondelegation case, held that Congress violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by delegating to coal producers and miners the power to make wage and hour laws.150 When Congress later reenacted the statute, this time tasking an agency with adopting
the standards, the Court held the delegation was constitutional because Con139 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
140 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
141 J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
142 See, e.g., Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) (holding that
charge to act in “public interest” satisfied nondelegation doctrine).
143 U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1–3.
144 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496
(2010) (holding that “two levels of protection from removal for those who nonetheless
exercise significant executive power” violates separation of powers); Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 695 (1988) (considering whether statute delegating federal prosecutorial authority to special independent counsel “disrupt[ed] the proper balance” between branches).
145 Lesley K. McAllister, Harnessing Private Regulation, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 61,
89 (2014) (noting “over 9,500 private standards [have] been incorporated by reference
into federal regulation”).
146 Id. at 92–93.
147 Id.
148 Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012).
149 See, e.g., Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 399 (1940).
150 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935).
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gress had not “delegated its legislative authority to the industry.”151 Thus,
the Court set an outer limit on “clearly arbitrary” delegations of lawmaking
authority to private parties.152
If private delegations of lawmaking and administrative power are sometimes constitutional, then it is hard to understand why delegations of government standing to private parties would always be unconstitutional, unless
Article III mandates a special rule just for standing. Article III expressly provides for jurisdiction over “controversies” involving states or the United States
and distinguishes jurisdiction over “controversies” involving only “citizens.”153 It does not, however, specify who may stand for the government in
judicially cognizable cases or controversies.
The argument that Article III does not require exclusive public control
is partly historical. As we have seen, early American courts were wary of recognizing private power to litigate government interests under the common
law. History also shows, however, that the legislature could authorize private
litigants to stand for the government even if the common law did not. Private litigants could prosecute crimes in the District of Columbia and the territories,154 suggesting, at a minimum, that Article I, Article II, and the Due
Process Clause were not perceived to prohibit private enforcement of the
United States’ interest in enforcing the laws.155 The practice of qui tam litigation, in turn, suggests that Article III courts could entertain government
suits brought by formally private plaintiffs. When the legislature specially
provided for it, a private relator could sue on behalf of the government to
enforce the law, with the relator retaining part of the recovery as a bounty.
During the Founding era Congress enacted several qui tam statutes, a prac151 Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co., 310 U.S. at 399.
152 Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311. In DOT v. Association of American Railroads, the Court
considered a private nondelegation challenge but limited its decision to holding that
Amtrak was a governmental, not a private, entity and remanded the case to the lower
courts for further consideration of due process limits on congressional delegation of regulatory authority. See 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1234 (2015).
153 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
154 See Ryan W. Scott, Standing to Appeal and Executive Non-Defense of Federal Law After the
Marriage Cases, 89 IND. L.J. 67, 80 n.103 (2014) (citing as examples United States v. Birch,
24 F. Cas. 1147 (C.C.D.C. 1809) (No. 14,595); United States v. Dulany, 25 F. Cas. 923
(C.C.D.C. 1809) (No. 15,000); United States v. Lyles, 26 F. Cas. 1024 (C.C.D.C. 1806) (No.
15,645); United States v. Sandford, 27 F. Cas. 952 (C.C.D.C. 1806) (No. 16,221); and Virginia v. Dulany, 28 F. Cas. 1223 (C.C.D.C. 1802) (No. 16,959)).
155 Congress did not, however, authorize private prosecutions in Article III courts,
instead directing district attorneys to stand for the United States in criminal cases. See
Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 112, at 699. The exclusive use of public prosecutors in
Article III courts may have reflected an understanding that private prosecutions did not
present a justiciable case or controversy. Or it may have reflected merely a policy choice.
Cf. Scott, supra note 154, at 80 (arguing “widespread practice of private criminal prosecution” suggests private standing for government interests presents a justiciable case or
controversy).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-2\ndl203.txt

612

unknown

Seq: 28

notre dame law review

4-FEB-16

9:02

[vol. 91:2

tice that has continued into the modern day.156 Federal courts have long
recognized standing under these statutes.157
Thus, the history cannot sustain an absolute Article III ban on private
standing for government interests. When the legislature had not authorized
it, as in the case of public nuisance law, a court would not empower a private
litigant to enforce the law on the government’s behalf. By contrast, when the
legislature had authorized private litigants to stand for the government, as in
the case of qui tam, Article III courts would accept jurisdiction. Perhaps the
most important historical lesson is that the distinction between “public officials” and “private litigants” is not self-defining. The distinction was not so
sharp at the Founding (or for some time thereafter) as we like to think it is
today. As Nicholas Parrillo has recently described, for much of the nation’s
history the federal and state governments relied upon bounties and other
financial incentives to encourage even formally public officials to enforce the
laws.158 Ultimately, policymakers concluded this system created too great a
risk of arbitrary enforcement, which prompted the shift to salaried public
enforcers.159 The image of the disinterested Attorney General, as contrasted
with the interested private litigant, is a familiar one, but its familiarity belies a
complex history of legislative experiments to address the constitutional concern about arbitrary enforcement.
The best Article III argument for limiting state standing to traditional
executive officials is functional: if Congress or the state legislatures authorized any citizen to stand for the government in any case, there would be an
explosion in suits filed on behalf of governments and thus an unconstitutional expansion of the federal judiciary’s role. The Perry Court raised the
litigation-explosion concern,160 but the facts of Perry did not pose the problem and the agency law solution Perry adopted is unnecessary to solve it. Perry
did not pose the problem because it involved the defense of a state law by a
“small, identifiable group” who had made a “substantial” commitment and
had a “unique role” in the enactment of the law.161 If the case had involved
private standing to sue on behalf of a state, an Article III argument about a
sweeping expansion of judicial power might have been plausible. Even granting the theoretical concern, however, it is unnecessary to incorporate the
Restatement (Third) of Agency into standing law in order to address it. Not all
government interests present the problem, and, more important, the
requirement of constitutional accountability more than addresses it.
156 See Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40
STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1408 (1988).
157 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2665 (2013).
158 NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 1780–940 (2013).
159 See id.
160 Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2667 (2013).
161 Id. at 2668–69 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002,
1024 (Cal. 2011)).
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Explaining Why Government Standing Must Be Constitutionally Accountable

Standing is a structural doctrine loosely tied to constitutional text, original meaning, and history. Government standing, this Section argues, is
about the interplay of the first three Articles of the Constitution and the Due
Process Clauses, not just Article III.162 Reading due process norms and structural principles together is not unfamiliar. Rebecca Brown in particular has
rethought the separation of powers in due process terms, arguing that “individual liberty [is] an important value in resolving structural issues.”163 This
Section argues that government standing must be constitutionally accountable because of the threats it poses to the rights of opposing parties and third
parties not before the court.
1.

Constitutional Structure

The Court has interpreted Article III to prohibit legislatures from placing the power to litigate for the government with litigants who would be “free
to pursue a purely ideological commitment.”164 The concern that a litigant
will use public power for private ends is an important one, but placing it
solely in Article III is both imprecise and unconvincing. After all, Article III
requires only that private litigants show an injury-in-fact to have standing to
sue, and plaintiffs with Article III injuries may litigate for ideological
reasons.165
Article III might be read together with Article II to find a limit on standing rooted in constitutional accountability. Article II vests the “executive
Power” in the President, gives the President the power to appoint “Officers of
the United States”, and obliges the President to “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.”166 Together these clauses “protect all individuals from
government overreaching” by making the President accountable for executing the law.167
Tara Leigh Grove has looked to the Take Care Clause to argue that
standing is an Article II nondelegation doctrine.168 She argues that Article II
162 See Jack M. Balkin, The American Constitution as “Our Law”, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
113, 129–30 (2013) (“Structural arguments are . . . arguments about how different parts of
the Constitution should work together, and thus play their appropriate role in a larger
scheme.”).
163 Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1517
(1991).
164 Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2667 (2013).
165 See Mark V. Tushnet, The “Case or Controversy” Controversy: The Sociology of Article III: A
Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698, 1700–09 (1979).
166 U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1–3.
167 Krent, supra note 15, at 531; see also id. (explaining that in absence of “centralized
control over law enforcement . . . governmental authority might be exercised for private,
self-interested ends”).
168 Grove, Nondelegation, supra note 5, at 781. Grove’s account is an alternative to the
conventional Article II account of standing doctrine, which argues that private standing to
seek judicial review of agency action violates Article II unless the plaintiff has suffered an
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prohibits Congress from creating sweeping “private prosecutorial discretion”
to litigate the United States’ administrative interests.169 This nondelegation
principle limits private plaintiffs from arbitrarily burdening the property and
liberty rights of private defendants.170 Grove’s elegant and powerful theory
thus sounds in Article II but depends upon concerns about individual rights
and arbitrary enforcement.171
Constitutional concerns about protecting individual rights from arbitrary enforcement sound not simply in Article II or Article III, but also in due
process. Gillian Metzger explains that “allowing exercises of government
power outside of constitutional constraints” violates the Due Process Clauses’
“prohibition on arbitrary government action”; in other words, due process
reflects a structural constitutional commitment to keeping government
power constitutionally accountable.172 Looking beyond Articles II and III to
due process jurisprudence helps specify the contours of constitutional
accountability. Article III, as Part I discussed, cannot by itself determine who
may stand for the government in federal court. Neither can Article II. For
instance, Article II, which concerns federal executive power, does not address
the logically and doctrinally distinct problem in Hollingsworth v. Perry, namely,
whether there are limitations on the authority of the states to delegate the
power to stand for the state in federal court to parties outside the state executive branch. And Article II cannot explain why a traditional state actor—a
state attorney general, for example—has standing to enforce federal law.
Moreover, the Article II approach focuses upon private standing to litigate
the federal government’s administrative interests and does not address who
may stand for the United States and the states in all types of government
suits, including corporate, institutional, and substitute suits. As this Article
injury-in-fact. Justice Scalia, among others, has argued that when Congress authorizes an
“ideological” plaintiff to seek judicial review of federal agency action, it encroaches upon
the President’s “executive power” to enforce and administer the law. See Antonin Scalia,
The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 881 (1983). The problems with the conventional Article II account are well known
and need no lengthy recitation. A litigant with an injury-in-fact can interfere with executive policymaking as readily as one without it. Whether a litigant has an injury-in-fact has
nothing to do with whether judicial review encroaches upon a constitutionally protected
zone of presidential prerogative. See Cass R. Sunstein, Article II Revisionism, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 131, 136 (1993) (“If suits against the executive by people with individuated interests
do not violate Article II—as everyone agrees—it is hard to see why the same suits violate
Article II merely because of the absence of an individuated interest.”).
169 Grove, Nondelegation, supra note 5, at 790–91; see also Harold J. Krent & Ethan G.
Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1793, 1808 (1993) (looking to Article II to argue that “[e]mploying private attorneys general to combat the risk of
under-enforcement also creates the risks of overenforcement and arbitrary rule”).
170 See Grove, Nondelegation, supra note 5, at 788–90.
171 Grove explains that the executive branch’s prosecutorial “duties are nondelegable”
only when cases “implicate private liberty.” Id. at 790–91; see also id. at 824 (noting that the
“Article II nondelegation principle appears to be a logical extension of other constitutional
rules that seek to protect private liberty against arbitrary encroachment”).
172 Metzger, supra note 13, at 1461.
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argues, the constitutional concerns vary across the four government interests.
To see why, it is necessary to explore the due process foundations of the
constitutional accountability principle.
2.

Due Process

Just as due process is a “potential limit on the private exercise of regulatory power,”173 it is also a potential limit on the private exercise of the power
of government standing. Due process prohibits a deprivation of life, liberty,
or property except in accordance with law.174 The Founders linked this due
process guarantee with structural values. Nathan Chapman and Michael
McConnell explain that early court decisions applying due process to legislative acts “were consistently based on [a combined] . . . separation-of-powers
and due process logic.”175 On this logic, “[l]egislative acts violated due process [when] . . . they exercised judicial power or abrogated common law procedural protections.”176 Thus, a due process violation could inhere in an
improperly structured delegation of authority.177 A similar structural link
between due process and delegation, Ann Woolhandler has argued, existed
from the Reconstruction until the New Deal.178 In this vein, in Yick Wo v.
Hopkins the Court struck down under the Due Process Clause a standardless
delegation of authority to city officials, who were free to discriminate against
Chinese-Americans when deciding whether to grant permits to operate laundries.179 Liberal democracies demand that government action be based
upon public reasons, not raw preferences, or what Yick Wo called “the play
and action of purely personal and arbitrary power.”180 Eventually this under173 Alexander Volokh, The New Private-Regulation Skepticism: Due Process, Non-Delegation,
and Antitrust Challenges, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 931, 933 (2014); see Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
174 Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885, 1890
(2014). Scholars debate whether the Founders intended more than this procedural guarantee. Compare RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 221–44 (2d ed. 1997) (arguing that due process means procedures alone), with Louise Weinberg, An Almost Archaeological Dig: Finding a Surprisingly Rich
Early Understanding of Substantive Due Process, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 163 (2010) (arguing that
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause encompassed substance), and Ryan C. Williams,
The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 415 (2010) (arguing that
the Fifth Amendment encompassed only procedure but that the Fourteenth Amendment
encompassed procedure and substance).
175 Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers,
121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1677–78 (2012).
176 Id. at 1677.
177 See id. at 1724.
178 Ann Woolhandler, Delegation and Due Process: The Historical Connection, 2008 SUP. CT.
REV. 223, 225–26.
179 118 U.S. 356, 369–70 (1886); see Woolhandler, supra note 178, at 240 (noting conceptual connection between tax-assessment and rate-regulation cases and Yick Wo).
180 Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370.
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standing of due process expanded to include substantive review of legislative
action.181
According to the Court’s contemporary gloss, the Due Process Clauses
aim at a “scheme of ordered liberty” and a “fair and enlightened system of
justice” that are “rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people.”182
These traditions recognize “the basic unfairness of depriving citizens of life,
liberty, or property, through the application . . . of arbitrary coercion.”183
a.

Arbitrary Enforcement

This concern with arbitrary coercion arises across an array of due process doctrines that impose limits upon substantive law and enforcement
design, including the private nondelegation doctrine already discussed184
and doctrines that address criminal law and procedure as well as civil procedure and remedies.
i.

Criminal Law and Procedure

In Oyler v. Boles, the Court held that due process precludes a prosecutor
from prosecuting an individual based upon “an unjustifiable standard such as
race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.”185 Selective prosecution may
violate due process where the prosecutor singles out a defendant for his exercise of another constitutionally protected right, such as the right to free
speech,186 where there is evidence of arbitrary prosecutorial policies,187 or
where a prosecutor makes a charging decision out of personal vindictiveness.188 Indeed, even the “potential for vindictiveness” may violate due
process.189
Due process does not, however, entail reasonableness review of every
prosecutorial decision. Federal courts are reluctant to police prosecutorial
discretion in the ordinary course, reasoning “that the courts are not to inter181 See Woolhandler, supra note 178, at 247–55.
182 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled on other grounds by Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
183 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 587 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring).
184 Supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text.
185 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
186 See, e.g., United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 621–22 (7th Cir. 1973) (discussing
evidence that “Assistant United States Attorney had told [defendant’s] attorney” that
“defendant’s draft-counseling activity was one of the reasons why the prosecution for nonpossession of draft cards was brought”); Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Discretion and
Selective Prosecution: Enforcing Protection After United States v. Armstrong, 34 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1071, 1108–09 (1997) (discussing Falk).
187 See United States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538, 1540 (11th Cir. 1987) (discussing evidence that prosecutor had described enforcement “policy . . . brought on by the ‘arrogance on the part of blacks’” in jurisdiction); Poulin, supra note 186, at 1109 (discussing
Gordon).
188 Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27–28 (1974).
189 Id. at 28.
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fere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the
United States in their control over criminal prosecutions.”190 In United States
v. Armstrong, the Court held that if the prosecutor has probable cause to
charge, the decision to do so (or not) “generally rests entirely in his discretion.”191 It thus falls to structural constraints on prosecutorial discretion and
subconstitutional law prophylactically to address the risk of arbitrary enforcement by public prosecutors.
Some structural checks on arbitrary prosecutions stem from the Due
Process Clause itself. The Court’s void-for-vagueness cases explain that a constitutional concern with arbitrary enforcement is “basic,”192 deeply rooted,193
and cuts across the usual conceptual division between structure and rights.
In Kolender v. Lawson, the Court located the void-for-vagueness doctrine in
due process, requiring legislatures to notify an “ordinary” person “what conduct is prohibited” and to discourage “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”194 At the same time, the Court reasoned that the doctrine does not
focus upon actual notice to individuals, but rather upon the structural
requirement “that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement.”195 Without sufficient structural constraints, the Court
explained, there is a constitutionally unacceptable risk that policemen, prosecutors, and jurors will enforce the law based upon “their personal predilections”196 rather than public reasons.197
ii. Civil Procedure and Remedies
The due process concern for arbitrary enforcement appears not only in
criminal procedure, but also in the law of civil remedies. In Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., for example, the Court considered whether, under the Due Process
Clause, there was an “impermissible risk of bias” in the Fair Labor Standards
190 United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965); see Rebecca Krauss, Note,
The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins and Development, 6 SETON HALL
CIR. REV. 1, 11 (2009) (explaining that Cox contains a “widely cited” statement of
doctrine).
191 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364
(1978)).
192 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
193 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 & n.7 (1983) (citing United States v.
Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875) (locating void-for-vagueness doctrine in separation of powers)) (discussing “roots” of void-for-vagueness doctrine).
194 Id. at 357.
195 Id. at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)).
196 Id. (quoting Smith, 415 U.S. at 575).
197 The constitutional concern for arbitrary enforcement also recurs across a wide array
of other criminal procedure rules, including the Fourth Amendment, the right to a jury
trial, and the writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 616–17
(1980) (White, J., dissenting) (Fourth Amendment); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
155–56 (1968) (jury trial); Douglas A. Berman, Making the Framers’ Case, and a Modern Case,
for Jury Involvement in Habeas Adjudication, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 887, 897 (2010) (habeas
corpus).
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Act’s enforcement scheme.198 Under the FLSA, civil penalty awards went to
the coffers of the Department of Labor, the agency tasked with enforcing the
Act. Due process prohibits, the Court had earlier held, biased adjudication
by requiring “an impartial and disinterested tribunal.”199 This prophylactic
rule, the Court explained, mitigates the risk of actual bias in a particular
proceeding.200 But, the Court found, the risk of bias in Jerrico did not offend
due process because it was “exceptionally remote,” not least because no
agency official’s salary depended upon civil penalties.201 Though making
clear that prosecutors are not subject to “strict requirements of neutrality,”
the Court also explained that “[a] scheme injecting a personal interest, financial or otherwise, into the enforcement process may bring irrelevant or
impermissible factors into the prosecutorial decision and in some contexts
raise serious constitutional questions” under the Due Process Clause.202
Fuentes v. Shevin provides an example of an enforcement scheme with
fatal constitutional flaws.203 Florida and Pennsylvania had authorized private
citizens to order state agents to seize personal property based upon nothing
more than an ex parte application claiming a right to the property and the
posting of a security bond.204 Merchants in both states used this authority to
seize stoves, stereos, beds, tables, and the like from consumers who had purchased goods under installment sales contracts.205 The Court struck down
the enforcement scheme, holding that a state may not permit “[p]rivate parties, serving their own private advantage, . . . unilaterally [to] invoke state
power to replevy goods from another” without a “fair prior hearing.”206
Due process, the Court has held, limits the size of punitive damage
awards so that they “are not imposed in an arbitrary manner.”207 Here, as
elsewhere, the Due Process Clause draws a distinction between public reasons
and raw preferences in the enforcement of law, requiring “[e]xacting” judicial review to reduce the risk of a deprivation of property based upon a “decisionmaker’s caprice.”208 Farther afield, but still instructive, are the due
process restrictions upon personal jurisdiction, which require that the defen-

198 446 U.S. 238, 239 (1980).
199 Id. at 242.
200 See id.
201 Id. at 250.
202 Id. at 249–50 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 528 (1976 ed., Supp. III) (precluding federal prosecutor with personal interest from participating in case)).
203 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
204 Id. at 69–70.
205 Id. at 70–71.
206 Id. at 93, 96–97.
207 Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 420 (1994); see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003).
208 Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418 (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp.,
Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001)).
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dant have “sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it
reasonable and just” for the plaintiff to haul her into court there.209
b.

The Right to One’s Day in Court

Due process protects not only defendants in enforcement actions, but
also third parties whose rights may be at issue in the case. The Supreme
Court has described a “deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should
have his own day in court.”210 This tradition treats a right of action as a
“constitutionally recognized property interest” protected by due process.211
By recognizing a property interest in a right of action, due process jurisprudence protects an “individual litigant’s autonomy in deciding whether to
pursue her claim and if so, how best to conduct that litigation.”212 This property interest includes both the right to sue and the “right not to sue,”213
which, taken together, form the right to determine whether one’s rights will
be vindicated in court. This due process concern has surfaced in the backdrop of government standing decisions. For example, in Director, Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs, Department of Labor v. Newport News Shipbuilding
& Dry Dock Co., the Court explained that “[a]gencies do not automatically
have standing to sue for actions that frustrate the purposes of their statutes.”214 The Interior Department, for instance, does not have standing “to
bring a suit for assault when [a] camper [in a national park] declines to do
so” even though the Department manages the national park system.215
Like any other property right, the day-in-court right does not guarantee
a rights-holder absolute control.216 Indeed, the contours of the day-in-court
209 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945). Personal jurisdiction doctrine can be understood to apply where an enforcement action “would arbitrarily [invoke]
governmental power in light of the individual interests at stake.” Charles W. “Rocky”
Rhodes, Liberty, Substantive Due Process, and Personal Jurisdiction, 82 TUL. L. REV. 567, 574
(2007).
210 Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93 (2008) (quoting Richards v. Jefferson Cty.,
517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)).
211 Tulsa Prof’l Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988) (stating there is
“[l]ittle doubt” that a right of action is a form of property); Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985).
212 Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1574 (2007); see also Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1092 (2012) (describing right of
action as property bundle including remedy to which plaintiff is entitled as well as “right to
control the action” and “right to avoid tortious conduct altogether”).
213 Williams, supra note 33, at 599; see also Maximilian A. Grant, The Right Not to Sue: A
First Amendment Rationale for Opting Out of Mandatory Class Actions, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 239
(1996).
214 514 U.S. 122, 132 (1995).
215 Id.
216 See Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 233 (1992) (“[T]he American system of adjudication has historically
recognized classes of cases in which individuals did not have a strong claim to participate at
all.”); see generally Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Demo-
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right remain a matter of debate, particularly in negative-value and small
claims cases where individual litigation is impracticable.217 The “dominant”
understanding requires courts to consider the due process right to one’s day
in court, but permits them “to trade off losses in litigant control against social
gains (in particular, reductions in the expense of litigation).”218
Even where the Constitution does not guarantee litigant autonomy, it
protects a “right to adequate representation” when one’s rights are litigated.219 The foundational modern precedent is Hansberry v. Lee, which held
that a class action may bind absent class members without violating the Due
Process Clause if the members’ interests were “in fact adequately represented
by parties who [were] present [in the class action].”220
Various procedural rules implement the day-in-court right. Among the
most important are preclusion rules. Generally, a litigant may litigate issues
and claims without regard to “a judgment to which she was not a party.”221
But she may be precluded from doing so where another litigant adequately
represented her interests in prior litigation.222 Where a private litigant
brings a class action, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 aims to protect the
day-in-court right through procedural safeguards. Rule 23(a), for example,
precludes certification unless the court determines the class plaintiff will be a
fair and adequate representative of the class.223 Rule 23(g), in turn, requires
the court to assess whether class counsel will adequately litigate the class’s
claims.224 Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirements of notice and opt-out also protect a
due process “right to sue.”225
cratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (2009) (explaining that property rights are not
absolute).
217 Compare, e.g., Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative Representation: Lessons
for Aggregate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577, 580 (2011) (arguing
that “day-in-court right” is “flexible” and “accommodates competing concerns at its core”),
and Campos, supra note 212, at 1087 (arguing that “litigant autonomy is self-defeating in
the mass tort context”), with Redish & Larsen, supra note 212, at 1575 (arguing for robust
“litigant autonomy” based upon due process and First Amendment right to free expression
and contending that only “compelling” justification can justify denial of autonomy).
218 Jay Tidmarsh, Superiority as Unity, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 565, 567 (2013).
219 Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Owen M. Fiss, The
Allure of Individualism, 78 IOWA L. REV. 965, 970–71 (1993).
220 311 U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940); see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812
(1985) (explaining that a “named plaintiff [must] at all times adequately represent the
interests of the absent class members”).
221 Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 898 (2008).
222 See Richards v. Jefferson Cty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996) (discussing due process guarantee and permissible grounds for issue or claim preclusion).
223 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); see David Marcus, Making Adequacy More Adequate, 88 TEX. L.
REV. 137, 138 (2010) (“Adequate representation, which Rule 23(a)(4) requires as a prerequisite to certification, is thus the constitutional prerequisite for the empowered modern
class action.”).
224 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g).
225 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011) (citing Phillips Petroleum
Co., 472 U.S. at 812).
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Against this backdrop, the link between the day-in-court right and standing are apparent. The Court has justified the rule against third-party standing by invoking litigant autonomy: the rights-holder may “not wish to assert”
her rights.226 Lea Brilmayer has argued standing protects litigant autonomy,
which she calls “self-determination,” and addresses “fairness problems that
would arise if an ideological challenger” were to inadequately represent
“someone else’s . . . rights.”227 By limiting standing to those who have suffered an injury-in-fact, the doctrine (in theory) mitigates the due process
problem of inadequate representation. The Court’s private standing decisions are consistent with this reasoning, frequently labeling private parties
without injuries-in-fact as “concerned bystanders”228 seeking to litigate someone else’s rights.229
D.

Keeping Government Standing Constitutionally Accountable

Government standing threatens individual rights to liberty and property,
which gives rise to the demand that those who stand for the government in
226 Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113–14 (1976).
227 Brilmayer, supra note 32, at 306, 308, 310; see also Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1666 (2007) (“[S]tanding protects people’s ability to
individually determine the best use of their rights.”). Noting that the “analogy to class
actions is particularly apt,” Tushnet argues the solution is not an “elaborate” standing doctrine but rather “auxiliary devices”—like the Rule 23 procedures—to “enhance the representativeness of the [litigating] process.” Tushnet, supra note 165, at 1716, 1717 n.77. For
consideration of the use of auxiliary devices, see infra notes 277–82 and accompanying
text.
228 Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986) (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412
U.S. 669, 687 (1973)).
229 Due process concerns about the rights of defendants and third parties are also present when a private litigant claims standing to litigate in federal court. Why, then, does the
doctrine distinguish government and private standing? When a private party sues, standing doctrine protects the rights of defendants and third parties by limiting what counts as a
judicially cognizable interest. By contrast, when a litigant claims standing on the government’s behalf, the doctrine limits who may stand for the government; as this Article argues,
there must be mechanisms in place to address the risk of abuse of government power.
It may be that standing law tolerates a greater risk of abusive litigation in cases involving private standing than in those where the litigant claims standing to litigate on the
government’s behalf. But that should not surprise. As Erwin Chemerinsky has explained,
even “eliminating the concept of state action would not mean that private parties always
would be held to the same institutional standards as the government” because “[o]ften
there might be justifications for private behavior that would not sanction governmental
conduct.” Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 506. When it comes to private standing, as Part II
explained, the countervailing justifications have to do with the demand for a system of
open courts that places some decisions “to complain about an alleged wrong . . . uniquely
with the victim.” Goldberg, supra note 98, at 601. When it comes to government standing,
as I have argued in detail elsewhere, these countervailing justifications do not exist: governments do not have rights to remedies and someone suing on the government’s behalf
cannot claim a constitutional entitlement to vindicate her private interests in court. See
Davis, supra note 5, at 14–15 (explaining that governments, unlike private parties, do not
have rights to remedies).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-2\ndl203.txt

622

unknown

Seq: 38

notre dame law review

4-FEB-16

9:02

[vol. 91:2

court be constitutionally accountable. Constitutional accountability may be
satisfied through nonconstitutional constraints on actors wielding government power, including public control, private law, procedural controls on
enforcement discretion, and auxiliary mechanisms to force consideration of
third parties’ interests. This Section explains which constraints are necessary
for the different types of government suits. It distinguishes between standing
for a state and standing for the United States because Article II is best read to
require executive branch control as a way of ensuring constitutional accountability in some cases involving the federal government’s interests.
1.

The Basic Framework

In place of the exclusive public control view, this subsection takes as its
starting point the four different government interests. The fundamental
insight is that the constitutional concerns apply differently in the four types
of government suits and, therefore, the constraints on government standing
should be different depending upon which government interest is at stake.
a.

Standing for a State

State executive officials may stand for the state in federal court. State
law determines who may stand for a state in the first instance because states
have the authority to structure their own governments under our system of
federalism. The authority of a state to “define[ ] itself as a sovereign”
includes the authority to “prescribe the qualifications of its officers and the
manner in which they shall be chosen.”230 Federal law, of course, may limit
this authority, but federal courts are generally reluctant to presume a limitation on how a state structures its government.231
State law has the first but not the final say on who may stand for the state
in federal court. Though states need not follow Articles I or II when structuring their governments, litigants who wield the power of state standing in federal court must be constitutionally accountable.
The primary constitutional limit on a state legislature’s discretion to
delegate the power of state standing is the Due Process Clause. Due process
constraints on delegation are not absolute, however.232 In specifying how
much constraint on private delegations of government standing is necessary
to satisfy constitutional accountability, it is useful to look to procedural due
process jurisprudence. In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court laid out a three-factor balancing test to determine how much process is due when an individual
claims a threat to her due process protected rights.233 First, the court considers “the private interest that will be affected by the official action.”234 Next, it
230 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (quoting Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel.
Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 161 (1892)).
231 See id. at 470.
232 See supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text.
233 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
234 Id. at 335.
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looks to “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards.”235 Finally, the court must weigh “the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.”236 Thus, due process permits substantial legislative flexibility while
requiring constitutional accountability.
b.

Standing for the United States

Article II, statutes, and historical practice support the authority of executive branch officials, most importantly the Attorney General, to stand for the
United States. Several statutes provide the Attorney General with standing
for the United States both to enforce federal laws and to defend them.237
The most important statute provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise authorized
by law, the conduct of litigation in which the United States . . . is a party, or is
interested . . . is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the
direction of the Attorney General.”238 Federal courts have interpreted this
statute to require statutory authorization before someone other than a DOJ
attorney may litigate on behalf of the United States.239 A private litigant
must, therefore, show that Congress has authorized her to “conduct . . . litigation” on the United States’ behalf in order to have standing to do so.240
Is there an absolute prohibition on a congressional assignment of the
United States’ standing to private litigants? If so, its textual hook would be
Article II. Courts and commentators have offered two types of Article II arguments that would require public control over the standing of the United
States in all cases. The first is based upon the Appointments Clause, which
gives the President the power to appoint principal “Officers” and directs Congress to decide whether the President, heads of departments, or courts may
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 See 28 U.S.C. § 518 (2012) (empowering Attorney General and Solicitor General to
stand for United States in Supreme Court litigation); id. § 519 (providing that the Attorney
General’s office has standing to litigate for United States except where otherwise provided
by law); id. § 2403 (permitting the Attorney General to intervene on behalf of United
States in cases where constitutionality of federal statutes is at stake).
238 Id. § 516.
239 See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp.
51, 56 n.8 (D.D.C. 1973). Courts have not, however, interpreted the statute to prohibit
judicial implication of public rights of action where the Attorney General, or a federal
agency with statutory authority to conduct litigation, sues. The constitutional distinction
between traditional executive officials, who may request an implied public right of action,
and nontraditional private litigants seeking to stand for the government, who require
express statutory authorization, lies in the principle of constitutional accountability.
Unlike private litigants, traditional executive officials are directly constitutionally accountable and are subject to electoral and other forms of public control.
240 See 28 U.S.C. § 516.
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have power to appoint “inferior Officers.”241 In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court
suggested that the Appointments Clause prohibits private litigants from
standing for the United States: only “Officers of the United States,” it opined,
may litigate “public rights” in the federal courts.242 But the lower courts have
almost universally rejected Buckley’s dictum,243 reasoning that the Appointments Clause (as well as the implied presidential removal power244) applies
only to “Officers” and not to individuals who exercise “occasional and intermittent” power under federal law to act on behalf of the United States.245
This Article has nothing to add that debate.
It does, however, add another way to understand a second type of Article
II argument for exclusive public control of the United States’ standing. This
argument stems from Article II’s Take Care Clause and the separation of
powers. Its lodestar is Morrison v. Olson, in which the Court upheld the Ethics
in Government Act’s creation of a special independent prosecutor tasked
with investigating and prosecuting wrongs by high-ranking government officials.246 The Court reasoned that the Act had not “disrupt[ed] the proper
balance” between the branches because the executive retained a measure of
control over the independent counsel, including through a for-cause
removal provision.247 Morrison suggests that a nontraditional litigant may
have standing to litigate the United States’ interests depending upon the
depth and breadth of her enforcement discretion and the degree of retained
executive control.248 My aim is not to rehearse the debate about how much
control Morrison requires but rather to add a crucial insight that’s been miss241 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
242 424 U.S. 1, 140 (1976) (opining that “primary responsibility for conducting civil
litigation in the courts of the United States for vindicating public rights . . . may be discharged only by persons who are ‘Officers of the United States’” (quoting U.S. CONST., art.
II, § 2, cl. 2)).
243 See Robin Kundis Craig, Will Separation of Powers Challenges “Take Care” of Environmental Citizen Suits? Article II, Injury-in-Fact, Private “Enforcers,” and Lessons from Qui Tam Litigation, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 93, 140–41 (2001). The appointment of “inferior Officers,” of
course, can be vested in the federal courts, see U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2, which suggests
another way to address the Appointments Clause problem, cf. Caminker, supra note 31, at
377 (“Congress can choose to vest the power to appoint inferior officers in Federal
judges . . . .”). For a discussion of the distinction between principal and inferior officers,
see Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661 (1997).
244 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 119 (1926).
245 See Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327–28 (1890) (quoting United States v.
Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 512 (1878)).
246 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
247 Id. at 695 (quoting Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)).
248 Cf. Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens
in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1442–45 (2000) (discussing Morrison). But cf. Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 527
(2005) (arguing that “if the president exercises ultimate control over popular actions—by
retaining authority to discontinue them—the grant of executive power poses no constitutional difficulty to the creation of popular actions”).
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ing from that debate: the answer depends upon which government interest is
at stake.
2.

Distinguishing Among the Four Government Interests
a.

Corporate Interests

Like a private corporation, a government has property and contractual
interests. Corporate suits present a constitutional accountability concern
because they involve litigation against a defendant with property and liberty
interests. One example is qui tam litigation under the False Claims Act
(FCA). A common complaint is that qui tam plaintiffs are politically unaccountable repeat players who haul private defendants into federal court
under the FCA for frivolous or vexatious reasons.249 The complaint is easily
overstated, however. Where the government interest looks like a private
injury, recognizing standing is not likely to raise significant due process concerns because the litigant’s discretion is necessarily circumscribed to
redressing specific claims arising from contract, from “torts to real or personal property, and from frauds, deceits, and other [bilateral] wrongs.”250
The power to litigate corporate interests is not sweeping. It extends no further than the power to litigate a personal wrong against the government.
i.

States

The presumption in favor of public control should be overcome in corporate suits where private law addresses the risk of arbitrary enforcement.
Assignment of a private party’s contract and property interests is a familiar
feature of private standing. In Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc.,
the Court held that the assignee of a legal claim for money has standing to
litigate the claim,251 even where the litigant has duty to return “all proceeds
of the litigation.”252 It explained that there is a long historical tradition,
beginning in the seventeenth century, that an assignee with legal title has
standing to sue on the claim.253 Today, the Court went on, it is commonplace for federal courts to “entertain suits which will result in relief for parties that are not themselves directly bringing suit,” giving examples of suits by
trustees, guardians ad litem, receivers, and executors.254 When the Court
249 See Michael Rich, Prosecutorial Indiscretion: Encouraging the Department of Justice to Rein
in Out-of-Control Qui Tam Litigation Under the Civil False Claims Act, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233,
1237 (2008).
250 Myriam E. Gilles, Representational Standing: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the Future of Public
Law Litigation, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 315, 343–44 (2001) (quoting 4 JOHN NORTON POMEROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1275 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941)).
251 554 U.S. 269, 271 (2008).
252 Id. at 298 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
253 Id. at 275–76 (majority opinion).
254 Id. at 287–88. But see id. at 302 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“We have never
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recognizes private standing based upon contractual assignment, it relies
upon private law constraints to limit the assignee’s enforcement discretion.
Private law can help assure accountability in cases involving a state’s corporate interests. Where a private litigant abuses the limited power to litigate
a state’s corporate interests, she may be subject to suits for abuse of process
and vexatious litigation.255 In other words, private law remedies may substitute for direct constitutional constraints. One of the most instructive examples of ensuring constitutional accountability through private law emerged
through the evolution of the Bivens doctrine, which holds that federal courts
may imply private rights to damages remedies directly from the Constitution
in some cases.256 In Minneci v. Pollard, a prisoner at a privately operated
federal prison sued the private operators for damages under Bivens for
alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment.257 The Court refused to imply
a federal remedy after concluding that the plaintiff could sue the private
operators under state tort law. It explained that the common law provided
an “‘alternative, existing process’ capable of protecting the constitutional
interests at stake.”258 In Minneci, private law ensured constitutional
accountability.259
ii. United States
As Minneci holds, private law can ensure constitutional accountability
when a private party acts on the United States’ behalf. Similarly, private law
constraints may apply when a litigant stands for the United States’ interests in
corporate suits. The familiar example is qui tam litigation under the FCA,
which makes persons who defraud the federal treasury liable for damages
and authorizes both the DOJ and private litigants to sue on behalf of the
United States.260 To encourage private suits, the statute permits a private
relator to retain a portion of the recovery.261 A private litigant filing an FCA
suit may not serve the complaint on the defendant before notifying the DOJ,
which has sixty days to review the complaint and material evidence.262 If the
DOJ decides to do so, it may take over the litigation, and the private relator
approved federal-court jurisdiction over a claim where the entire relief requested will run
to a party not before the court.”).
255 E.g., Kollodge v. State, 757 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Alaska 1988).
256 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
392 (1971).
257 Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012).
258 Id. at 623 (quoting Wilkie v. Robbins 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007)).
259 To the extent there is evidence that the threat of tort liability does not sufficiently
deter arbitrary enforcement in cases involving corporate interests, a court might deny
standing unless there are procedural controls on the litigant’s enforcement discretion.
The federal False Claims Act, which authorizes a private relator to stand for the United
States’ corporate interests, provides a familiar example of such controls. See 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730 (2012).
260 Id. § 3730.
261 Id. § 3730(d).
262 Id. § 3730(b).
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cannot direct the DOJ’s decisions.263 The DOJ may also intervene for good
cause after a private relator files the complaint and can veto a dismissal of the
suit.264 In Stevens, the Court held that a private relator suing under the FCA
has Article III standing but did not decide whether the scheme violates Article II.265
Defendants in FCA actions may use the threat of private law liability to
deter arbitrary enforcement; for example, defendants sued by private relators
may counterclaim for malicious prosecution.266 They also may have causes
of action for libel, defamation, and abuse of process, as long as the relator’s
claims are false.267 The difficult question is whether Article II requires more
than the threat of tort suits to keep FCA relators constitutionally accountable.
The debate about the FCA’s constitutionality is not usually framed this
way. Instead, courts begin with Morrison v. Olson. They agree that the FCA
does not give the executive branch as much control over initiating litigation
as the independent counsel statute at issue in Morrison.268 Then they either
distinguish Morrison because it involved criminal prosecution and conclude
the FCA is constitutional or apply Morrison and hold the FCA violates Article
II.269
This Article’s approach is more nuanced. On the one hand, it rejects
the notion that constitutional accountability concerns are significant only in
criminal prosecutions. Judges who have thought the FCA’s qui tam provision
unconstitutional are right to worry where “unaccountable, self-interested
relators are put in charge of vindicating [public] rights.”270 On the other
hand, it is wrong to equate the authority to vindicate a government’s corporate interests with the authority to litigate an administrative interest. Moreover, it is wrong to judge the FCA’s constitutionality without assessing whether
private law and the FCA’s procedural constraints adequately safeguard
defendants from arbitrary enforcement. If the FCA’s “most severe violation[ ] of the separation of powers principles embedded in the Take Care
263 Id. § 3730(c).
264 Id. §§ 3730(a), (d).
265 Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 778 n.8 (2000).
266 United States ex rel. Head v. Kane Co., 668 F. Supp. 2d 146, 153–54 (D.D.C. 2009)
(counterclaim available, though not timely until court has held defendant not liable under
FCA).
267 See United States ex rel. Miller v. Bill Harbert Int’l Constr., Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d 20,
27–28 (D.D.C. 2007).
268 See, e.g., Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d 749, 754–55 (5th Cir. 2001);
United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 751–53 (9th Cir. 1993); see also United
States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1155 (2d Cir.
1993) (holding that FCA gives the executive branch “substantial control” over litigation).
269 Compare, e.g., Riley, 252 F.3d at 754–55 (concluding Morrison “is inapplicable”
because “relators are simply civil litigants”), with id. at 766 (Smith, J., dissenting) (concluding that FCA is unconstitutional because it “contains not a single one of the control mechanisms that the Morrison court found [in the independent counsel statute]”).
270 Id. at 766 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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Clause” is that it creates a threat of arbitrary enforcement,271 then it follows
that the Act’s constitutionality must be judged by reference to all the constraints on a private relator’s enforcement discretion.
On this view, Congress may assign the enforcement of the United States’
corporate interests to a private litigant where private law and other controls
limit the risk of arbitrary enforcement. This approach finds support in
recent empirical studies that suggest the risk of arbitrary enforcement by qui
tam relators is overblown. Based upon an analysis of 4,000 qui tam cases,
David Engstrom found that law firms that specialize in relator suits “enjoy[ ]
higher litigation success rates and surfac[e] larger frauds compared to less
experienced firms.”272 Moreover, repeat plaintiffs win less but obtain “substantially larger sums” than one-off relators.273 Both findings suggest that the
qui tam device has fostered private enforcement by expert players who,
rather than bring speculative and arbitrary actions, identify and remedy substantial fraud against the United States.274
b.

Institutional Interests

Unlike corporate suits against private defendants, most institutional litigation involving the state action problem has arisen when a formally private
actor claims authority to defend government action against a private lawsuit.
Perry is an example. There is no direct sense in which a private actor’s
defense of a government’s institutional interests presents a risk of an unconstitutional burden upon liberty or property. While a government has institutional interests in its authority to govern and its intergovernmental
immunities, it does not have an individual due process right when the validity
of its actions is at stake.
Instead, due process concerns in institutional suits are indirect. It is not
that institutional standing empowers a litigant to select enforcement targets
arbitrarily, except in the very rare case where a government has standing to
wield its institutional interests as a sword against private defendants. Nor will
an institutional suit impact unrepresented private rights by directly precluding follow-on claims. Rather, the concern is that a judgment in an institutional suit will crowd out or otherwise dilute unrepresented private rights. In
Arizona v. United States, for instance, the federal judicial system proceeded
first to the Obama Administration’s challenge to Arizona’s “hand me your
papers, please” immigration policy, rather than focusing upon private challenges under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.275 In some cases
institutional suits may establish unfavorable precedent. Imagine, for example, that the State of Pennsylvania had brought, and lost, a Tenth Amend271 Id.
272 David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui
Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1249 (2012).
273 Id. at 1250.
274 Id. at 1249–50.
275 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). I thank Michael Olivas for a
conversation that prompted this point.
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ment challenge to the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementing Act
before Carol Anne Bond raised her Tenth Amendment defense in Bond v.
United States.276 These concerns demand that a court ensure that those who
stand for a government’s institutional interests are likely to be capable
advocates.
i.

States

Public control is presumptively required in institutional suits, but the
presumption may be overcome where the legislature limits standing to litigants likely to be capable advocates and the use of auxiliary procedures such
as amicus participation ensures adequate consideration of the interests of
unrepresented third parties. Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion in Perry
supports this approach. Kennedy would have held that Proposition 8’s proponents had standing to defend the “right” of the people of California “to
make law.”277 The California Supreme Court, after all, had held that Proposition 8’s proponents had authority to stand for the state. To deny standing, the California Supreme Court reasoned, would undermine the ballot
initiative process by leaving the defense of an initiative solely in the hands of
elected officials—the very officials whose control a ballot initiative is
designed to avoid.278
Pointing to the California Supreme Court’s decision, Justice Kennedy
emphasized inherent limitations on the proponents’ enforcement discretion
and the many signs they would be capable advocates of the state’s institutional interests. Their enforcement discretion was limited by their size, singular focus upon Proposition 8’s defense, and transparency to the public. As
Kennedy explained, the “official proponents [were] a small, identifiable
group” whose “identities [were] public” and “commitment [was] substantial.”279 They were “especially likely to be reliable and vigorous advocates for
the measure and to be so viewed by those whose votes secured the initiative’s
enactment,” given their “unique role” in securing the initiative, their unique
“stake in the outcome” of the litigation, and their unique “understand[ing]
[of] the purpose and operation” of Proposition 8.280
These limitations on discretion and indicia of capable advocacy are necessary, but not sufficient, to address concerns about unrepresented third parties. A government’s institutional standing presents broad-ranging questions
of government structure that may impact an array of private and public interests. Auxiliary procedures provide a solution to the problems of widespread
and overlapping claims of public and private right in institutional cases.281
While recognizing standing to litigate institutional claims, the federal courts
276 See Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2363–64 (2011).
277 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2675 (2013) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
278 Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1007 (Cal. 2011).
279 Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2669.
280 Id. at 2669–70 (quoting Perry, 265 P.3d at 1024).
281 See Tushnet, supra note 165, at 1716 (discussing use of “auxiliary devices” as alternative to injury analysis for standing).
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do, and should, invite broad participation through amici briefing or intervention. Conscientious docket management also can play an important role
where the sequencing and consolidation of cases is necessary to allow consideration of the multifarious interests at stake in institutional litigation.
ii. United States
The standing problem in Windsor was solved by the “capable” advocacy
of a group of congressional representatives.282 But what if the Court had
addressed it as California tried to address the same problem in Perry, that is,
by authorizing a private litigant to defend the government’s institutional
interests in the validity of its laws? Brianne Gorod has argued that “where
neither branch is willing to defend [a federal] statute, the courts should
appoint lawyers to . . . represent the United States.”283 After all, she points
out, “the prospect of private counsel representing the United States . . . is
hardly unprecedented,” as qui tam shows.284 The fundamental concern is
that “the United States’ laws should be . . . defended well,” and carefully
selected private counsel can do that.285 The separation of powers should not
be a bar to private litigation because, Gorod argues, the executive branch
“may not always be able to serve as a simple agent” for the United States,
whose institutional interests may be best served by private counsel.286 On
this view, Article III does not prohibit private defense of the United States’
laws.
Still, Article II may require what Article III alone does not: executive
control of institutional standing for the United States. Article II’s Take Care
Clause obliges the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” creating a duty that supports executive standing to defend federal
laws.287 This duty might in turn imply an exclusive executive responsibility to
litigate institutional cases.288
The Court has not, however, treated executive branch authority to
defend federal law as exclusive. Instead, both Windsor and INS v. Chadha cut
against reading the Take Care Clause as an exclusive grant of standing to the
executive in institutional suits. Chadha concerned the constitutionality of the
legislative veto in an immigration matter and relied in part upon intervention by both houses of Congress in concluding the case was justiciable not282 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013).
283 Brianne J. Gorod, Defending Executive Nondefense and the Principal-Agent Problem, 106
NW. U. L. REV. 1201, 1251 (2012).
284 Id. at 1254.
285 Id. at 1254–55.
286 Id. at 1255.
287 Grove, Standing, supra note 5, at 1331–32 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
288 Cf. id. at 1368 (offering powerful argument that “Congress may not appeal in the
executive’s stead” when executive branch refuses to defend federal law, but “bracket[ing]
the question whether Congress could create” an “‘independent counsel’ who might step in
to defend a law in place of the executive”).
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withstanding the executive’s argument the veto was unconstitutional.289
Though Windsor and Chadha do not establish congressional standing to
defend federal law, they do strongly suggest that the executive’s duty to
defend the United States’ institutional interests is not exclusive.290
This Article’s framework shows that there are not compelling rightsbased reasons for concluding that only the executive branch may defend the
United States’ institutional interests. To the extent that the separation of
powers is not an end in and of itself, but rather a means to protecting liberty
and property rights, the argument for limiting institutional standing solely to
the DOJ is not particularly convincing. Such a limit is not necessary to
ensure to capable advocacy and adequate consideration of third parties’
interests in institutional suits.
Even so, there is a strong formal argument for executive exclusivity. In
particular, there are strong formal reasons to think a “divided self” has no
standing in court.291 By statute, the executive branch has the right to intervene “for presentation of evidence” and “for argument on the question of
constitutionality” in any action “wherein the constitutionality of any Act of
Congress affecting the public interest is drawn in question.”292 There is a
growing literature debating whether this statutory right reflects the executive
branch’s exclusive duty to defend federal laws.293 If the executive branch has
a duty always to defend the United States’ laws, then it is doubtful that a
private litigant may simultaneously stand for the United States’ institutional
interests where the executive branch stands for (or at least should stand for)
those same interests.
c.

Substitute Interests

Litigation of a government’s substitute interests triggers concerns about
the day-in-court right in all cases and concerns about arbitrary enforcement
in those cases where a defendant’s liberty and property interests are at stake.
The concern about arbitrary enforcement in substitute cases is less significant
than the same concern in administrative cases. When a government sues to
vindicate the private rights of its citizens, it must show an injury to those
rights.294 This requirement necessarily limits the government’s enforcement
289 462 U.S. 919, 940 (1983).
290 But cf. infra notes 355–58 and accompanying text (arguing there may be reasons to
deny congressional standing for United States even where private standing is permissible).
291 See Michael Herz, United States v. United States: When Can the Federal Government Sue
Itself?, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893, 894 (1990).
292 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (2012).
293 See, e.g., Gorod, supra note 283, at 1217–20 (discussing and ultimately rejecting
exclusivity view).
294 This limitation follows from the definition of substitute interests, which includes
only those cases in which a government invokes its parens patriae authority to vindicate the
private rights of its citizens. In those cases, the government seeks a recovery for injuries to
individuals, though it is required to allege its own interest separate from the interest of any
particular individual. New York v. Seneci, 817 F.2d 1015, 1017 (2d Cir. 1987). In other
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discretion. In administrative suits, by contrast, the government litigant does
not need to show an injury to private rights, but may establish standing based
upon the government’s general interest in enforcing the law. This subsection focuses upon the necessary protections for the day-in-court right in substitute suits, leaving to the next subsection a discussion of the problem of
arbitrary enforcement.
The Court has been solicitous of state substitute suits, holding that a
state may sue in parens patriae to address problems it would otherwise address
through police power regulations.295 By contrast, the doctrine has been wary
of implying substitute rights of action in favor of the United States.296
Because neither Congress nor the courts have created a procedural system to
police the adequacy of representation, “substitute litigation may wrest control
of private rights from an individual beneficiary without the procedures that
protect a beneficiary’s right to her day in court.”297 First, a substitute suit
may preclude subsequent private litigation based upon the same rights.298
Second, a substitute suit may violate the right to decide whether one’s rights
will be vindicated in court, or what Ryan Williams has called the “right not to
sue.”299
There are many solutions to this type of problem, including policing of
the adequacy of representation at the front end through, as in the case of
Rule 23 class actions, judicial inquiry, notice, and opt-out rules, or at the back
end through preclusion doctrine.300 Government standing doctrine may
also play a role in addressing this due process concern, including by limiting
who may stand for the government in parens patriae litigation.
i.

States

In other work I have argued that federal courts do not have general
authority to empower traditional executive officials to bring substitute suits.
The argument against a generous implication doctrine is partly doctrinal:
federal courts do not have general common law powers.301 The argument is
also partly concerned with due process. Where Congress has authorized substitute suits and provided procedures to police the adequacy of representawork I have explained that this separate-interest requirement is largely meaningless in
cases where the government is aggregating private claims. I therefore distinguish between
parens patriae suits that involve only public rights, such as actions to enjoin interstate nuisances, and actions that may not be maintained absent injuries to private rights, such as
state substitute suits to vindicate citizens’ employment law rights. Only the latter involve
substitute standing. See Davis, supra note 5, at 23–24.
295 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
296 See, e.g., United States v. Solomon, 563 F.2d 1121, 1129 (4th Cir. 1977).
297 Davis, supra note 5, at 41; see Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public:
Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 548 (2012).
298 See City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 357 U.S. 320, 340–41 (1958).
299 Williams, supra note 33, at 604.
300 Lemos, supra note 297, at 548.
301 See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981).
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tion, the courts have no warrant to deny standing. But where Congress has
been unclear about the existence or scope of substitute standing, the courts
should deny standing, particularly in the absence of “specific rules” that
“delineat[e]” the scope of potential liability, “establish[ ] who is bound by the
action,” and “prevent[ ] duplicative recoveries.”302
There is, however, an active debate about how significantly substitute
suits threaten due process. Margaret Lemos has argued that the threat is
serious, particularly because of the preclusive effect of judgments in substitute suits,303 while Prentiss Cox has argued that the due process concerns are
minimal, because existing statutory regimes adequately “align public enforcement with private rights” and judgments in substitute suits do not always preclude private litigation.304 But even if the concerns are minimal in some
cases when a traditional executive official stands for the state, surely the picture changes when a private litigant seeks to aggregate claims on the state’s
behalf.
Courts should presume that private litigants may not bring substitute
suits on a government’s behalf unless there are procedural controls to ensure
adequate representation. This presumption follows from a comparison of
substitute standing with class actions. Both present the familiar due process
problems of aggregate litigation. The class action device is ringed round
with procedural protections, including requirements that both the class
plaintiff and class counsel be adequate representatives. Thus, there is already
a mechanism for private litigants to aggregate claims consistent with due process. If the legislature needs to assign to a private litigant the government’s
power to aggregate claims through substitute standing, it should have to provide some mechanism to protect a rights-holder’s interest in adequate
representation.
Though the cases have not gone quite that far, they have required specific authorization before a nontraditional litigant may stand for the state in a
substitute suit. There are two types of cases in which the problem has arisen.
In the first type, a private litigant claims that it has a unique relationship with
the state that impliedly authorizes it to exercise the state’s parens patriae
power.305 In the second type, a state actor, but not the state attorney general
or a state agency with general litigation authority, claims parens patriae standing.306 In both types of cases, federal courts deny parens patriae standing for
302 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 266 (1972) (dismissing state parens
patriae action under these circumstances).
303 See Lemos, supra note 297, at 488.
304 Prentiss Cox, Public Enforcement Compensation and Private Rights 1 (Minn. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 14-36, Oct. 1, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2503999.
305 The most interesting cases involve hospitals claiming standing as quasi-public actors.
See, e.g., Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 436 (3d Cir. 2000);
Stamford Hosp. v. Vega, 674 A.2d 821, 828–29 (Conn. 1996).
306 See, e.g., Meek v. Martinez, 724 F. Supp. 888, 901 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
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lack of specific statutory authorization,307 even though they have generously
implied substitute standing for state attorneys general who have general
authority to litigate on behalf of the state.
The more difficult cases arise where the state is the named party in a
parens patriae suit but the attorney general has delegated litigation authority
to private counsel. This arrangement has become common; in an era where
the Supreme Court has cut back on class actions, public-private partnerships
can make up the enforcement gap by combining the expertise and resources
of private counsel with the standing of a state to aggregate claims.308 State
law usually constrains these arrangements, requiring specific authorization
and continuing public control over the private counsel’s litigation decisions.309 In the absence of these limits, the demand for constitutional
accountability might require dismissing a state’s substitute suit where the
state has functionally (though not formally) delegated its parens patriae
power.
ii. United States
Similar concerns apply when standing depends upon the United States’
substitute interests. An important and overlooked example involves federal
Indian law, which has a qui tam scheme permitting private litigants to rely
upon the United States’ standing to sue on behalf of Indians. Under fundamental principles of federal Indian law, the United States is a trustee for
Indians and may stand on their behalf in federal court.310 Under federal
Indian law’s qui tam scheme, a private litigant may claim the United States’
trust responsibility as the basis for standing in a suit to vindicate Indians’
interests.311 United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Development Corp., which was
litigated as a qui tam action, provides a good example of federal courts’ failure to grapple with the distinctions between substitute and other government
307 See, e.g., Thiebaut v. Colo. Springs Utils., 455 F. App’x 795, 801 (10th Cir. 2011);
Allegheny General, 228 F.3d at 437; Bd. of Educ. of Peoria v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 810 F.2d
707, 712 & n.7 (7th Cir. 1987).
308 See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 630 (2012).
309 See id. at 669 (citing Cty. of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 235 P.3d 21, 36 (Cal.
2010)).
310 Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296–297 (1942).
311 Until recently, federal Indian law had two qui tam provisions. Section 81 of Title 25,
which has since been amended to remove the qui tam provision, 25 U.S.C. § 81 (1994); 25
U.S.C. § 81 (2000), permitted “any person” to sue “in the name of the United States” for
violations of requirements regarding encumbering Tribal real property and to keep one
half of the recovery. See United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d 1208, 1210
n.1 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting pre-amendment qui tam provision). Section 201 of Title 25,
which remains on the books, permits an “informer” to sue for “[a]ll penalties which shall
accrue” under various provisions of Title 25, which protects the rights of Indian Tribes and
individuals, and to retain half of the recovery. 25 U.S.C. § 201 (2012); see United States ex
rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.4 (1943) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 201 approvingly).
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interests.312 In Hall, three non-Indians sued as qui tam relators to void contracts entered into by the Menominee Indian Tribe and a tribal development
corporation. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the standing question was
an easy one in light of other circuit precedent upholding qui tam standing to
vindicate the United States’ corporate interests under the False Claims
Act.313 “Once we accept the premise that the United States is the real plaintiff in a qui tam action,” the court of appeals explained, “it stands to reason
that challenges to the standing of the government’s representative are beside
the point.”314 Because the United States clearly had a judicially cognizable
government interest as a trustee for Indians, the non-Indian plaintiffs clearly
had standing to sue.315
Put differently, the Seventh Circuit held that non-Indians could sue on
behalf of the United States in a substitute capacity to protect the
Menominee’s interests from the Menonimees themselves and, in so doing, to
take half of any recovery. This holding cannot be sustained by pointing to
relator standing under the FCA, which, after all, vindicates the United States’
corporate interests in property and contract. Hall makes the distinction
plain, although the Seventh Circuit plainly failed to see it: substitute suits
involve the interests of third parties not before the court and thus trigger due
process concerns about the day-in-court right. The problem in Hall was also
obvious: the private relators’ suit challenged the Menominee Tribe’s actions
and thus was in direct conflict with the Menominees’ interests as they understood them.
This Article’s framework makes clear that Hall was wrongly decided.
Federal courts are wary of substitute standing when Congress has not
expressly authorized it.316 But even where Congress has authorized a substitute suit, a private litigant should not have standing to vindicate another private party’s rights in the United States’ name if there are no due process
safeguards.
d.

Administrative Interests

In the typical administrative case a regulated party faces an enforcement
action by the government. Her property and liberty interests are at stake.
Tara Grove has explained the threats to individual liberty and property from
administrative standing in memorable terms: “If a private plaintiff had the
discretion to sue any person, anywhere in the country, for any violation of
law, she . . . would have . . . the power to target the defendants of her
choice.”317 Standing doctrine addresses the inherent risks by limiting who
may litigate a government’s administrative interests.
312 See 49 F.3d 1208.
313 Id. at 1213.
314 Id.
315 See id. at 1214.
316 See, e.g., United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 199, 201 (3d Cir. 1980)
(refusing to imply substitute standing in favor of United States).
317 Grove, Nondelegation, supra note 5, at 823.
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States

The litigation of administrative interests—particularly the sweeping
interest in enforcing the law—has generated much debate about the metes
and bounds of Article III. The constitutional accountability approach clarifies the debate. States may have judicially cognizable administrative interests
under federal law where Congress has given state governments a role in
implementing federal regulatory schemes. In an administrative suit, the
power of government standing is brought to bear against the liberty or property of a private defendant, which creates a risk of arbitrary enforcement.318
When it comes to formal state actors, our constitutional tradition has
addressed the due process concern in administrative cases through a combination of constitutional rights, procedural controls, and political constraints.
These controls are sufficient to ensure constitutional accountability and a
federal court may recognize both express and implied rights of action when a
traditional state actor seeks to enforce administrative interests.319 But a
court should presume that a private litigant not subject directly to the Constitution may not stand for the state in administrative suits unless the legislature
has clearly authorized it and imposed public controls on the litigant’s
enforcement discretion.
Permitting private litigants free reign to enforce the law on a state’s
behalf presents a significant “risk of an erroneous deprivation” of the due
process right against arbitrary enforcement.320 At the same time, “there
[are] obvious advantage[s] to allowing others to act on behalf of the government” in administrative suits, particularly where there is a “shortage of [public enforcement] resources.”321 Congress often balances these competing
concerns by creating public control over private attorneys general.
One example is executive oversight, as under the FCA. Article II and the
separation of powers may mandate executive oversight in administrative
cases, even where the party suing is a state government. After all, state suits
to enforce administrative interests under federal law are similar to citizen
suits, insofar as both implement federal regulatory law. In other words, in
administrative suits a state has some latitude to determine who will represent
it, but the state’s representative may need to be subject to some public control by the federal executive.
318 See id. at 784 (“[S]tanding doctrine protects individual liberty by shielding private
parties from arbitrary exercises of private prosecutorial discretion.”).
319 Davis, supra note 5, at 53–62.
320 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (explaining that courts in
procedural due process cases must consider “private interest” affected and “risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest”).
321 Erwin Chemerinsky, Controlling Fraud Against the Government: The Need for Decentralized Enforcement, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995, 1006 (1983); cf. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335
(considering government’s interest in existing procedures and costs of “additional or substitute procedural requirement[s]”).
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ii. United States
Standing doctrine might limit the threat of arbitrary enforcement in
administrative suits by restricting what counts as a judicially cognizable
administrative interest. It might, for example, require the U.S. Attorney General to show that someone, even if not the United States, has been injured
before bringing a prosecution. The doctrine has not done so for good reason. Public enforcement of federal law by formal state actors plays an important part in ensuring the rule of law.
Private enforcement may also play an important role, but formally private litigants are not subject to the same institutional checks as formal state
actors. One remedy for overbroad grants of private enforcement discretion
is to strike down the legislative grant of standing.
The challenge, of course, is to identify when private enforcement of government interests raises such serious constitutional concerns that a court
should hold the delegation invalid. Meeting that challenge requires distinguishing among the four types of government interests. The recent debates
about standing under the federal false-marking statute are a good example of
the problem of treating all government suits the same. Until 2011, the falsemarking statute provided that “[a]ny person may sue” to enforce a prohibition upon deceptively marking an unpatented product as if it were patented,
with half the penalty going to a successful plaintiff and the other half to the
United States.322 After the Federal Circuit held that the statutorily prescribed $500 penalty applied per article,323 private plaintiffs flocked to file
false-marking suits, including a $5.4 trillion suit against Solo Cup for allegedly falsely marking twenty-one billion plastic cups.324 Defendants argued
that the plaintiffs could not sue on behalf of the United States because the
false-marking statute did not provide for public control of their enforcement
discretion. The federal courts almost unanimously rejected this argument,
analogizing the false-marking statute to the FCA, which the Court held in
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens validly created
qui tam standing under Article III.325 But the FCA presented a different
question in Vermont Agency, namely, whether Congress could authorize private enforcement of the United States’ corporate interests, which involve specific contract and property interests and cannot give rise to a $5.4 trillion
damages claims for violation of the United States’ administrative interests.326
Courts that treated the constitutionality of the false-marking enforcement
322 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) (2006); see Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
125 Stat. 329, § 16(b)(1)–(3) (2011) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 292(b)).
323 Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
324 Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
325 Luka v. Procter & Gamble Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 712, 719 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (citing Vt.
Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens 529 U.S. 765, 773–74 (2000)). Federal
courts distinguished Morrison v. Olson as concerned with criminal prosecutions and therefore upheld the enforcement scheme under Article II as well. See id.
326 See supra text accompanying note 250.
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scheme as an easy question showed no awareness of the uniquely vexing constitutional concern about arbitrary enforcement in administrative suits.
Focusing upon this concern allows for sensible distinctions between constitutional and unconstitutional citizen suit provisions. Recall, for example,
the citizen suit provision at issue in Laidlaw.327 The Laidlaw Court held that
an environmental group had standing under the CWA’s citizen suit provision
to sue an alleged polluter even though “there had been ‘no demonstrated
proof of harm to the environment.’”328 Justice Scalia’s dissent was right that
there was no immediate and tangible injury-in-fact to the group’s members.
Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that the group’s “reasonable concerns” permitted them to sue for damages on behalf of the United States.329
If Perry’s right, then Laidlaw’s wrong. The CWA does not create a fiduciary relationship between the United States and citizen litigants.330 But the
citizen suit in Laidlaw was constitutional under this Article’s framework. The
plaintiffs’ interest in deterring future harm to themselves, as Sergio Campos
has argued, might be thought of as a due process value worthy of equal consideration alongside other constitutional concerns.331 And the Court
explained that the citizen suit did not pose “grave implications for democratic governance” because of executive checks on private enforcement.332
For one, the executive could “undertak[e] its own [enforcement] action”
and thus “foreclose a citizen suit.”333 For another, the executive had a right
to intervene in a citizen suit and to inform the court of its view of the dispute.334 Laidlaw thus supports a presumption that Congress may not assign
the United States’ administrative interests to a private litigant unless it does
so clearly and imposes public control on the scope and exercise of enforcement discretion.
Thus, this Article’s framework transforms the debate about the constitutionality of permitting private litigants to stand for the United States in
administrative suits. First, it forces us to distinguish two different types of
citizen suits. As Part II discussed, citizen suits against federal agencies ensure,
rather than undermine, constitutional accountability. The agency does not
have a due process right at stake in these suits. Citizen suits against agencies
present due process concerns only when, as in the case of some institutional
suits, adjudication of the claim will practically impact another party’s prop327 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
328 Id. at 199 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 956 F. Supp. 588, 602 (D.S.C. 1997)).
329 Id. at 183 (majority opinion).
330 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2013) (denying standing because
“petitioners owe” no “fiduciary obligation” to California, given that they are “free to pursue
a purely ideological commitment” to the lawsuit).
331 Campos, supra note 212, at 1092.
332 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 188 n.4 (quoting Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 202 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
333 Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1994)).
334 Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2)).
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erty or liberty.335 In these cases, as in institutional suits, auxiliary mechanisms address the constitutional concern about third party interests.
Second, under this Article’s framework, the starting point isn’t simply
whether only “public officials” may litigate “public rights.” Rather, it is
whether recognizing standing would result in a “clearly arbitrary” burden
upon due process protected rights.336 Public control is but one safeguard
against arbitrary enforcement. It is presumptively required, particularly in
administrative suits, both as a matter of due process and Article II. Using the
injury-in-fact requirement as the lodestar for implementing Article II, as Justice Scalia, its most fierce judicial advocate, has done,337 is both too narrow
and too sweeping. It is too narrow because injuries-in-fact are often easy to
allege, even in cases that arguably encroach upon the executive’s “discretion
to decide” whether to enforce federal regulatory law.338 It is too sweeping
because it lumps all suits involving government interests together even
though they present different constitutional concerns.
IV. EVALUATING

THE

CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY APPROACH
GOVERNMENT STANDING

TO

Thus re-envisioned, standing’s state action problem does not have a single solution. This Part evaluates the constitutional accountability approach
by considering some of its implications and addressing the important
objections.
A.
1.

Applications

Defendant Standing

Thus far this Article has treated plaintiff standing and defendant standing together. Defending a government interest may not, however, present
the same threat to opposing parties’ and third parties’ rights as initiating a
government suit. Consider the contrast between a typical institutional suit
such as Perry, in which a private litigant seeks to defend a law, and a typical
administrative suit such as Laidlaw, in which a private litigant sues another on
335 Consider, for example, a citizen action to force an agency to enforce the law against
another private party. See Grove, Nondelegation, supra note 5, at 829–30.
336 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936).
337 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 209–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
338 Id. at 210 (arguing that Article II prohibits citizen suit schemes in which “[e]lected
officials are entirely deprived of their discretion to decide that a given violation should not
be the object of suit at all”). In J.I. Case & Co. v. Borak, for example, the Court implied a
private right of action from the Exchange Act’s prohibition on fraudulent proxy solicitations, on the theory that private enforcement is a “most effective weapon” and a “necessary
supplement” to enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission. 377 U.S. 426,
432 (1964). This implied private right of action can easily be understood as the delegation
of government enforcement power even though a shareholder in a derivative suit clearly
has an Article III injury-in-fact. Rosenblatt v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 435 F.2d 1121, 1124 (2d
Cir. 1970).
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the United States’ behalf. The threat of arbitrary enforcement when a private litigant initiates an administrative suit is direct, while there is no obvious
threat to due process rights when a private litigant defends government
action.
Defendant standing is a tangled doctrine, with federal courts sometimes
opining that a defendant does not need standing under Article III.339 In the
mine run of cases, of course, defendants have standing because plaintiffs seek
a judgment that would injure their interests.340 But in some cases—Perry
being an obvious example—an adverse judgment would injure someone
other than the litigant who seeks defendant standing. In an important prePerry article, Matthew Hall argued that a state should be free to authorize a
private litigant to defend its laws in federal court.341
Practically speaking, a distinction between initiating and defending on
the government’s behalf would matter most for institutional suits. There are
vanishingly few, if any, real world examples where a private litigant claims
standing to defend a government’s corporate, substitute, or administrative
interests. The question, then, is whether the legislature may authorize a private litigant to defend a government’s institutional interests whenever it
wants, as long as it does so clearly. Perhaps deliberate legislative authorization itself satisfies constitutional accountability where a private litigant is
defending a statute on behalf of a government, which does not have due
process protected liberty or property rights at stake.
Institutional litigation may, however, impact private rights. Thus, the
distinction between initiating a government suit and defending a government’s action is not as sharp as it first appears. Requiring the legislature to
ensure that a private litigant will be a capable advocate of the government’s
position, as Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Perry would have done, is not a significant burden.342 Given the possibility that a judgment in an institutional suit
will practically impair private rights, a federal court should require not only
legislative authorization, but also a showing that a private litigant will mount
a capable defense of the government’s institutional interest and that auxiliary
procedures will permit adequate consideration of third parties’ interests.
2.

Standing to Appeal

Government standing doctrine might draw a distinction between standing at trial and standing to appeal, recognizing private standing to appeal on
the government’s behalf more readily than private standing to litigate for the
government at trial. Litigants must have standing to appeal a judgment no
less than to initiate a suit in the district court. In Diamond v. Charles, for
example, the Court denied standing to appeal to a private litigant who
339

See Matthew I. Hall, Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law Litigation, 80 FORDL. REV. 1539, 1557 (2012).
340 See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 618–19 (1989).
341 Hall, supra note 339, at 1583–84.
342 See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
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sought to defend a state law against constitutional challenge.343 Though the
litigant had intervened in the district court, the state had not specifically
authorized him to appeal on its behalf; indeed, the state’s attorney general
declined to appeal the judgment.344 Diamond was rightly decided under this
Article’s framework. It might be objected, however, that standing to appeal,
like standing to defend, does not pose the same constitutional problem as
standing to initiate a lawsuit. But appealing a judgment is initiating a suit in
the appellate court.
Indeed, standing to appeal on the government’s behalf could arguably
threaten individual rights directly in particular cases. In Perry, for example,
the plaintiffs won their challenge to Proposition 8 in the district court.345
Permitting Proposition 8’s proponents to appeal on the state’s behalf put
that victory, and the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, in jeopardy. On that
view, this Article is wrong to suggest that a private litigant’s defense of a government’s institutional interests differs from private litigation of other government interests.346 This objection is powerful. But there is a more
powerful response. Plaintiffs do not have an individual right to a wrong constitutional judgment. Nor, though perhaps the question is closer, do they
have a due process right to a state executive’s decision not to defend the
state’s law.347
3.

Criminal Prosecution

Looming over the discussion of administrative suits is the question whether
private criminal prosecutions comport with due process. On the one hand,
there are examples of private prosecution from American history.348 Moreover, in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., the Court held that a
district court has discretion to appoint a private attorney to prosecute a contempt action.349 On the other hand, our understanding of the prosecutor’s
role as a disinterested servant of justice suggests private prosecutorial discretion could violate due process.350 In Young, for instance, the Court reasoned
343 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986).
344 Id. at 61.
345 See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“Proposition 8 is unconstitutional under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses . . . .”).
346 See supra subsection III.D.2.b.
347 The question is closer because one might argue that popular lawmaking regarding
civil rights is constitutionally permissible only where there is a functional executive override. Cf. Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not “Republican Government”: The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 36–37 (1993) (arguing popular lawmaking
concerning civil rights may violate Guarantee Clause); see also Fred O. Smith, Jr., Due Process, Republicanism, and Direct Democracy, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 582, 593 (2014) (arguing that
popular lawmaking concerning civil rights runs afoul of procedural due process).
348 See, e.g., Roger Roots, Are Cops Constitutional?, 11 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 685,
689–90 (2001).
349 481 U.S. 787, 793 (1987).
350 See Martin H. Redish, Private Contingent Fee Lawyers and Public Power: Constitutional
and Political Implications, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 77, 95–96 (2010).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-2\ndl203.txt

642

unknown

Seq: 58

notre dame law review

4-FEB-16

9:02

[vol. 91:2

that a private attorney could not prosecute contempt in the name of the
United States if that attorney had a personal interest in the underlying
case.351 Young’s reasoning suggests an additional constraint in criminal
cases, namely the requirement that a private prosecutor be actually disinterested, which goes further than the limits this Article discusses for civil suits
that vindicate administrative interests. Additional restraints on private standing in criminal prosecutions reflect the longstanding distinction between
criminal prosecutions and civil suits and the direct and unique threats to
liberty and life that most criminal prosecutions pose.352
It is possible to argue that only standing by traditional state actors, such
as the U.S. Attorney General, and private standing in criminal prosecutions
present constitutionally cognizable concerns about arbitrary enforcement.
On that view, this Article has been too concerned about private litigation of
government interests in civil cases. But this objection fails for two reasons.
First, it makes too much of the distinction between criminal and civil enforcement; the Court has explained that due process also limits public officials
from arbitrarily bringing civil enforcement actions.353 Second, it makes too
little of the requirement of constitutional accountability for all exercises of
government power. A delegation of the power of government standing may
“itself violate[ ] the Constitution because it fails to ensure a sufficient level of
constitutional accountability.”354
4.

Legislative Standing

Thus far, I have bracketed the problem of legislative standing, which concerns when legislators have standing to sue in an official capacity. In the
main, legislative standing is orthogonal to the question this Article considers,
namely, who may stand for the United States or a state. Most cases involving
legislative standing present a different problem, which is whether a legislator
has judicially cognizable interests in her office or whether the legislature as
an institution has its own judicially cognizable interests distinct from those of
the United States or a state.355 But in some cases, a legislator may claim
standing to sue on behalf of the United States or a state. Because legislators
are traditional state actors subject to electoral discipline, this Article might
seem to endorse broad legislative standing to sue on behalf of the government. It does not. Legislative standing to represent the government
presents unique questions arising from the separation of powers, which may
limit legislators from executing the law, and the political question doctrine,
351 Young, 481 U.S. at 809.
352 See Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the CriminalCivil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 781–82 (1997) (discussing distinction between
criminal punishment and nonpunitive civil remedies).
353 See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249 (1980).
354 Metzger, supra note 13, at 1461.
355 See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821 (1997) (citing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433
(1939)) (discussing institutional injuries to legislators).
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which may require a court to stay its hand where legislators and executive
officials are at odds over law enforcement.356
This Article does not address the questions that legislative standing
raises. There is, however, an important point of contact between standing’s
state action problem and legislative standing. If Congress were to retain control over a private litigant it authorized to represent the United States, the
limits on congressional control of law execution would become relevant.
Congress may violate the Appointments Clause by playing a role in
appointing officers itself or by delegating significant executive authority to
individuals who are not appointed as officers but should be.357 This concern
about congressional aggrandizement does not apply, however, to qui tam
statutes and citizen suit provisions where a private litigant who is beyond congressional control seeks to stand for the United States.
5.

Preclusion

Where a private litigant stands for the United States or a state, the resulting
judgment may preclude subsequent litigation by a traditional executive official.358 Res judicata may, for example, preclude a federal agency from relitigating an enforcement action where a state agency has already litigated the
action on the federal government’s behalf, as sometimes occurs in cooperative federalism schemes.359 Similarly, private litigation of a government’s
claim may preclude subsequent litigation by executive officials. Federal
courts have, however, called preclusion in this scenario a “daring analytical
leap”360 because “[g]enerally, ‘individual litigation . . . does not preclude
relitigation by the government.’”361 But that is because private individuals
356 Grove & Devins, supra note 67, at 626–30.
357 See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501
U.S. 252, 277 (1991) (holding that members of Congress could not serve on board that
reviewed management of airports in Washington, D.C. area); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
130 (1976) (holding that Congress may not appoint officers itself).
358 See Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103 MICH.
L. REV. 589, 655 (2005) (noting “preclusion principles that would foreclose follow-on litigation after the first private (or public) attorney general suit has been litigated”). If the
legislature purports to authorize private standing but to permit the executive branch to
relitigate the same claim, then a court might disregard the limit on preclusion as a matter
of constitutional due process. Cf. id. (“Repeatedly subjecting a single defendant to liability
for the same harm to the same public interest could well raise constitutional difficulties
sounding principally in due process.”). But cf. Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 112, at
724 (“[I]f a loss by the private individual would not bar relitigation of the polity’s right by
others, then that right is not really at stake in such a way as to form the basis for a case.”).
359 See, e.g., Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 904 (8th Cir. 1999); United
States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 1980).
360 Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Hartigan, 816 F.2d 1177, 1180 & n.4 (7th Cir. 1987)
(quoting United States v. East Baton Rouge Par. Sch. Bd., 594 F.2d 56, 58 (5th Cir. 1979)).
361 Id. at 1180 (alteration in original) (quoting 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 4458.1 (2d ed.
1986)).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-2\ndl203.txt

644

unknown

Seq: 60

notre dame law review

4-FEB-16

9:02

[vol. 91:2

may not litigate on the government’s behalf unless they are authorized and
because private litigation need not involve government interests.362 Where,
for example, a government is in privity with private litigants and seeks to
relitigate private rights they have already litigated, the government’s action is
precluded.363 By parity of reasoning, private litigants authorized to stand for
the government may obtain (or lose) a judgment that precludes subsequent
suits by executive officials.364
B.
1.

Objections

Federalism

The most powerful objection to this Article’s approach sounds in federalism. Standing grounded in Article III does not apply in state courts.365
Standing rules grounded in the Due Process Clause would. Federalism may
be a reason to reject a theory of standing that sounds in constitutional
accountability.
Constraining government standing based upon a requirement of constitutional accountability rooted in due process is less objectionable to the
extent that state law already restricts delegation of law enforcement authority
to private parties. Importantly, “[i]t is generally acknowledged among the
states that delegations to private parties violate state constitutions.”366 State
law may invalidate delegations that federal due process would permit; for
instance, many states do not permit the delegation of state authority to federal
officials, who are politically accountable.367 Some state courts closely police
delegations of enforcement authority to unelected public officials in order to
ensure that they are subject to adequate controls.368 It is thus far from clear
that applying due process limits would significantly change most states’ standing laws.369
362 See id. at 1180–81 (holding that subsequent state litigation is not precluded where
state advanced its own interests, which prior private litigation did not involve).
363 Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 961–63 (9th Cir. 2006).
364 See United States ex. rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 936 (2009)
(noting that United States may be bound to judgment in qui tam action under FCA).
365 See James W. Doggett, Note, “Trickle Down” Constitutional Interpretation: Should Federal
Limits on Legislative Conferral of Standing Be Imported Into State Constitutional Law?, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 840–41 (2008).
366 Calvin R. Massey, The Non-Delegation Doctrine and Private Parties, 17 GREEN BAG 2D
157, 165 (2014).
367 See id. at 166.
368 See, e.g., State v. Robertson, 924 P.2d 889, 894 (Utah 1996).
369 Some states have adopted standing law consistent with this Article’s analysis. See,
e.g., Duncan v. New Hampshire, 102 A.3d 913 (N.H. 2014) (rejecting grant of citizen standing as impermissible delegation). To be sure, many states recognize “public right” standing more generously than the Court’s injury-in-fact test or treat standing law as prudential.
E.g., Trs. for Alaska v. State, 736 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1987). Here too, however, it is not clear
that due process analysis always would lead to significant changes in state law. For example, under Ohio standing law, a citizen may bring a “public-right action” in the “rare and
extraordinary case where the challenged statute operates directly and broadly to divest the
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To be sure, state courts often grant standing to challenge government
action where the Article III injury requirement would deny it, particularly in
citizen suits against the government.370 This Article’s framework would not
alter those state standing rules. Properly understood, standing in suits that
challenge unlawful government action is not a government power, but rather
part of a system of remedies that holds government constitutionally accountable.371 And, therefore, this Article’s framework for government standing
does not call for rolling back private standing to enforce individual rights
against state governments.372
Nevertheless, to the extent due process would entail changes to state
standing law regarding private attorney general actions against private
defendants, it raises serious federalism concerns. But any changes need not
track federal standing law jot-for-jot. In particular, there is an important distinction under this Article’s framework between enforcement of federal
rights and enforcement of state rights. As Part III discusses, more federal
executive control may be required for the enforcement of federal law as a
result of Article II’s vesting of the executive power in the President and its
charge that “he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”373 This
requirement would apply to the enforcement of federal rights in state court,
but would not limit state courts when enforcing state-created rights.374 In
cases involving state rights, due process and constitutional accountability permit legislatures substantial flexibility in designing government standing.
Consider a concrete example of legislative balancing of private attorney
general standing, which may be necessary for adequate enforcement of the
law, with the constitutional demand for limits on the discretion of those who
enforce the law on the government’s behalf. California enacted the Labor
Code Private Attorneys General Act (PAG Act) to address resource constraints on public enforcement.375 The PAG Act authorizes “an aggrieved
employee” to sue her employer for violations of the Labor Code, and allows
the plaintiff to keep twenty-five percent of the recovery while leaving seventycourt[ ] of judicial power.” Brown v. Columbus City Schs. Bd. of Educ., No. 08AP-1067,
2009 WL 1911904, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. June 30, 2009) (summarizing case law).
370 See, e.g., White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 226–27 (Cal. 1975).
371 See supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text.
372 Cf. Christopher R. Leslie, Standing in the Way of Equality: How States Use Standing
Doctrine to Insulate Sodomy Laws from Constitutional Attack, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 29, 66 (criticizing state courts for importing federal standing rules to deny remedies in challenges to
sodomy laws).
373 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
374 For discussion of the question whether state courts must employ Article III case-orcontroversy doctrine when adjudicating federal questions, see William A. Fletcher, The
“Case or Controversy” Requirement in State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CALIF. L.
REV. 263, 265 (1990) (arguing they must). This Article would impose a federal constitutional limit on state standing law grounded in the structural requirement of constitutional
accountability for government power, not in Article III itself.
375 Dunlap v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 614, 617 (Ct. App. 2006).
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five percent to the state.376 The Act creates private standing to vindicate the
state’s administrative interests as a necessary “supplement” to enforcement by
the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA), which cannot pursue every Labor Code violation.377 As originally enacted, the PAG Act posed
a constitutional accountability problem to the extent it did not “discourage”
private litigants from using private attorney general standing to file “frivolous
lawsuits” seeking “steep penalties for [violations of] . . . ‘relatively obscure’
Labor Code sections.”378 But as amended, the Act limits an employee’s
enforcement discretion. Among other provisions, the amended Act imposes
procedural controls on private enforcement: an employee must give pre-filing notice to the LWDA, which can bring its own enforcement action and
thus preclude private litigation; moreover, the Act requires pre-filing notice
to the employer, which has an opportunity to cure “less serious Labor Code
violations.”379 These amendments were enacted to “protect[ ] businesses
from shakedown lawsuits.”380 Under this Article’s framework, these safeguards against arbitrary enforcement satisfy due process.
States also have more flexibility in defining private rights to remedies
under state law than Congress does under the Federal Constitution. State
courts have primary authority to determine when state rights demand private
remedies and to define when standing involves a government power under
state law. The vast majority of states have express constitutional guarantees
that the courts shall be open to provide remedies for rights.381 The Federal
376 CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2699(a), (i) (West 2015).
377 Erich Shiners, Chapter 221: A Necessary but Incomplete Revision of the Labor Code Private
Attorneys General Act, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 877, 878–79 (2005).
378 Id. at 877, 881.
379 Id. at 887 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2699.3 (West. Supp. 2004)).
380 Dunlap, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 619 (quoting Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1809 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.), as amended July 27, 2004 5–6
(Cal. 2004)). The PAG Act might be understood to authorize a private attorney general to
litigate the state’s substitute interests, given that one aggrieved employee’s decision to sue
under the Act may preclude another employee from bringing a follow-on suit. See Iskanian
v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 147 (Cal. 2014). On that understanding,
the PAG Act, like other statutes that delegate the government’s substitute standing, has a
potential due process problem that can only be solved by some mechanism designed to
ensure adequate representation of absent parties’ private rights. But the Act is better
understood as vindicating the state’s administrative interest in enforcing the law rather
than as substituting government standing for individual employees’ enforcement of their
private rights. As the California Supreme Court has explained, “The act authorizes a representative action only for the purpose of seeking statutory penalties for Labor Code violations[,] . . . and an action to recover civil penalties ‘is fundamentally a law enforcement
action designed to protect the public and not to benefit private parties.’” Id. (quoting
People v. Pac. Land Research Co., 569 P.2d 125, 129 (Cal. 1977)). In other words, “[t]he
civil penalties recovered on behalf of the state under the [PAG Act] are distinct from the
statutory damages to which employees may be entitled in their individual capacities.” Id.;
see also id. at 151 (explaining that litigation under PAG Act “is not a dispute between an
employer and an employee arising out of their contractual relationship” and that “it is a
dispute between an employer and the state”).
381 Resnik, supra note 37, at 924 n.15 & app.1.
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Constitution does not expressly guarantee remedies for rights, instead incorporating the right-remedy principle as a matter of due process. All else being
equal, state courts have broader authority than federal courts to recognize
private rights to remedies as a basis for private standing under state law.
2.

Standing Minimalism

A second objection is that the constitutional accountability approach
requires standing doctrine to do too much. Even if standing doctrine is not
simply political theatre masquerading as law,382 a fair sense of history counsels caution in thinking that standing doctrine can reliably implement contested ideas of due process and the separation of powers.
Given the inevitable normative disagreement, perhaps standing should
take a “barebones approach” that “insist[s] only on real adversity between
plaintiff and defendant, and a plaintiff capable of generating a reasonably
good, ‘concrete’ record for decision.”383 Standing doctrine, the argument
goes, is simply not well-equipped to address difficult questions of institutional
design.384
Standing minimalism is a powerful challenge. It would largely, perhaps
entirely, eliminate doctrinal distinctions between private and government
standing. The purely pragmatic response is that the public-private divide is
too deeply set in the foundation of public law to be dug out and tossed aside.
The more sympathetic response is that a barebones approach to standing’s
state action problem would simply shift how the law addresses it.
The primary advantage of linking government standing and constitutional accountability is that it hones in on what makes government standing
difficult and the competing values at stake in defining and limiting the power
of government standing. Rather than fruitlessly search for the always elusive
injury-in-fact, the analysis focuses upon whether, and to what extent, concerns about remedying wrongs, arbitrary enforcement, and the right to one’s
day in court create constitutional constraints on the design of private and
public enforcement.
Properly conceived, standing is well-situated to address—prophylactically and only partially—the risk of abuse of government power. The doctrine cannot ferret out arbitrary bias or inadequate representation in every
case, but it can identify categories of cases where there is (more or less) concern about keeping those who stand for the government constitutionally
accountable in order to protect liberty and property interests. It is com382 See Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine? An
Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921–2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591, 647–54 (2010)
(“[O]ur evidence shows that standing preferences are distinguishable from merits preferences.”). But see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741,
1742–43 (1999) (“[J]udges provide access to the courts to individuals who seek to further
the political and ideological agendas of judges.”).
383 Tushnet, supra note 165, at 1706.
384 Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 635, 637 (1985).
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monly argued that prophylactic rules are illegitimate because they are overinclusive, Miranda v. Arizona385 being the famous example.386 This is not the
place to erect a defense of prophylactic rules, save to say that the criticism is
both descriptively inaccurate and normatively unsound. Descriptively, a
great many constitutional doctrines are “prophylactic” in that they arguably
overprotect a right.387 Courts adopt these doctrines based upon judgments
about their own, and other institutions’, competence. Normatively, “because
courts frequently cannot determine with much certainty whether or not a
constitutional violation has occurred in a given case,” they appropriately
“develop prophylactic rules safeguarding constitutional rights.”388 Restrictions on government standing are just such a prophylactic doctrine.
CONCLUSION
This Article’s framework aims at a more nuanced approach to government
standing than the Perry Court’s fiduciary rule, which restricts who may litigate
government interests to common law fiduciaries of the state. Difficulties distinguishing state from private actors are ubiquitous in public law, particularly
in an era of privatization of public regulation.389 Developments in standing
jurisprudence have brought standing’s state action problem into sharp focus,
as has renewed interest in the state action390 and private nondelegation391
doctrines. Scholars have pored over private standing and considered government standing, but have not explored how standing law should distinguish
state actors entitled to stand for the state from private litigants who are not.
By grounding the distinction in constitutional accountability, this Article has
reclaimed the right-remedy principle for standing analysis and shown that
striking down a private delegation of government standing based upon
injury-in-fact analysis or the Restatement (Third) of Agency is not always required
by the Constitution.

385 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
386 Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and Some Puzzles of “Prophylactic” Rules, 70 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1, 1 (2001) (“Constitutional law scholars have long observed that many doctrinal rules
established by courts to protect constitutional rights seem to ‘overprotect’ those rights, in
the sense that they give greater protection to individuals than those rights, as abstractly
understood, seem to require.”).
387 See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190,
190 (1988) (“‘[P]rophylactic’ rules are not exceptional measures of questionable legitimacy but are a central and necessary feature of constitutional law.”).
388 Caminker, supra note 386, at 2.
389 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 137, at 543; Metzger, supra note 13, at 1367; Jon D.
Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717 (2010); Martha Minow, Public
and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229 (2003).
390 See, e.g., John L. Watts, Tyranny by Proxy: State Action and the Private Use of Deadly Force,
89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1237 (2014).
391 DOT v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015).

